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Introduction: 
The 'cornerstone ofwomanhood' 
"'Woman! Isabelle scoffed. 'Why is child-bearing considered the corner-
stone of womanhood? Having young? Cows do that. Women are good for other 
things ... "' (Robert Herrick, Together, 1908i 
1 
The 'New Woman' whose image was widespread at the turn of the twentieth 
century, heralding a cult of individualism fuelled by the spirit oflbsen,2 was widely 
denounced by contemporaries. Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 referred to"the woman of 
this type" as "one of the most unpleasant and unwholesome features of modern life."3 
Isabelle Lane expressed the sentiments of the 'new' woman of Herrick's 
"great middle class," who in her eagerness for a 'large life' rejected "the process of 
nature .for which the institution of marriage was primarily designed."4 The flapper, 
the urban-based independent young woman of the 1920s, was also a phenomenon of 
the middle class. Though traceable to the earlier 'new woman,' she was no bohemian 
minority. In 1926 a German doctor observed that "women are fleeing Nora's doll's 
house not just in isolated cases but in battalions."5 The flapper represented a 
repudiation of traditional femininity as her class had understood it. She was 
characterised by her counter-ideological rebellion against a prominent immediate 
concern of her social and political milieu: the need to raise the birth rate. The flapper 
was visible in the 'masculine' sphere of the city, conspicuously 'child-free,' at a 
moment when nations most needed women to display their healing, regenerative 
capacities: after the trauma of the Great War. 
1 Robert Herrick, Together, New York: Macmillan, 1908, p. 392. 
2 The Norwegian playwright Henrik Johan Ibsen (1828-1906) was introduced to the 'woman question' 
during the 1870s by the novelist Camilla Collett. In 1880 his A Doll's House provoked international 
scandal for its depiction ofthe heroine Nora, who leaves her husband and domesticity to assert her 
right to live an independent existence outside the role of wife and mother. By the turn of the century 
the play had been translated into virtually every European language, and had been staged in major 
productions in London (1889) and Paris (1894), with Europe's leading actresses portraying Nora. See 
Susan Groag Bell and Karen Offen (eds.), Women, the Family and Freedom: The Debate in 
Documents, Vol. II: I 880-1950, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983, p. 17. 
3 Ibid., quoted p. 139. 
4Herrick, op.cit., pp. 190 and 93. 
2 
Zelda Fitzgerald, wife ofthe writer F. Scott Fitzgerald who chronicled the 
1920s in The Great Gatsby and other novels, was the quintessential flapper. Zelda 
underwent an abortion in 1922, apparently with Scott's support, but later he expressed 
revulsion at his "son" having gone "down the toilet of the xxx Hotel after Dr. X-
pills." He blamed the loss on what he termed the "chill-mindedness" of his wife.6 
Zelda went down in history as a woman with "no maternal feelings," as a Time review 
described her in 1970? 
The 'chill-mindedness' detected in Zelda and other flappers by their critics 
was a rejection of the paradigm of femininity associated with the renunciation of self 
and the nurture of others. The task of reproduction makes womanhood synonymous 
with sacrifice, a problem for feminists, who have long struggled with and challenged 
the correlation between the woman's 'natural' role of mother and her 'natural' 
subjection in the biological family. 8 It was in response to such a correlation that 
Friedrich Engels likened the relationship between man and wife to that of the 
bourgeois and proletariat, and Simone de Beauvoir later applied Hegel's master-slave 
parable to the relation between man and woman. 9 
An essentialist notion of woman as 'nurturer' perpetuates sexual inequality. 
Several prominent demographers believe that low fertility is an inevitable partner to 
growing equality between the sexes: they followed contemporary commentators in 
France, Germany, America and England who linked the 'woman question' to the 
decline in fertility. 10 
5 A tina Grossmann, Reforming Sex: The German Movement for Birth Control and Abortion Reform 
1920-1950, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 3. 
6 Kendall Taylor, Zelda and Scott Fitzgerald: Sometimes Madness is Wisdom, Sydney: Flamingo 
(Harper Collins), 2001, p. 114. 
7 
'No So Tender Was the Night: Zelda, by Nancy Milford', Time, June 15 1970, p. 80. 
8 See Mary O'Brien, The Politics of Reproduction, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981. 
Shulamith Firestone argues that woman's reproductive biology accounts for her original and continued 
oppression, and that this has applied to all cultures and stages of history; the patriarchal family being 
only the most recent form of family to oppress the woman according to the logic of 'nature': The 
Dialectic of Sex, London: Paladin, 1970, pp. 73-5. 
9 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated by H. M. Parshley, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, 
pp. 64-5. For Hegel's study of independence and dependence of self-consciousness, or lordship and 
bondage, see his The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie, Second Edition, London: 
Allen and Unwin, 1931, pp. 229-40. For a detailed critique of de Beauvoir's reading of Hegel, see 
O'Brien, op.cit., pp. 69-72; Friedrich Engels, The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the 
State, New York: International Publishers, 1972 (1884), p. 137. 
10 See, for example, Eva M. Bernhardt, 'Changing Family Ties, Women's Position, and Low Fertility' 
in N.Federici, K. Oppenheim Mason, and S. Sogner, (eds.), Women's Position and Demographic 
Change, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 81. 
3 
The demographic transition, a process synonymous with modernisation and its 
attendant anxieties, by the beghming of the Great War had seen a steady decline in 
births in wealthy, industrialised nations. 11 Towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
the fertility of most European countries, and of the United States, was undergoing a 
sustained decline, led by the social and economic elite. Malthusian concerns about 
population- characterised by fear of overpopulation and stress on resources - were 
by the 1870s a dead letter; 12 replaced by fears on a national level regarding 
manpower. Internationally, from the late nineteenth century, high fertility was 
perceived as a sign of national 'virility' and powerY Historians have tended to 
neglect the historicity of fertility decline, but as the authors of a recent study asserted, 
"demography is too important to be left to demographers."14 
The war and postwar period saw an unprecedented degree of attention devoted 
by the state to issues of natality, as the discourses of nationalism and depopulation 
became conflated in the minds of politicians, demographers and pronatalists. 
Pronatalism, by definition, is the organised ideology of fear of depopulation. 15 Tamar 
Mayer has noted that when a nation is faced with internal and external pressures it 
polices and employs coercive means to control sexuality.16 Michel Foucault 
described an "era of bio-power" characterised by the "administration of bodies and 
the calculated management oflife."17 The decade following the losses of World War 
I was a period of intense ferment in the area of control of population: the pronatalist 
and birth control movements were both examples of 'bio-power' in the modern world. 
11 On the theory of the demographic transition see Michael S. Teitelbaum, The British Fertility 
Decline: Demographic Transition in the Crucible of the Industrial Revolution, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984, pp. 3-5; Angus McLaren, Sexuality and Social Order: The Debate over the 
Fertility of Women and Workers in France, 1770-1920, New York: Holmes and Meir, 1983, pp. 9-27, 
and Jean-Claude Chesnais, The Demographic Transition, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 
12 Thomas Robert Malthus' hugely influential Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) had stressed 
the need for population restraint. The Malthusian paradigm held sway until well into the nineteenth 
century, when growing awareness of fertility decline saw a rapid change of focus in the population 
question. 
13 Comelie Usborne, 'Pregnancy is the woman's active service': pronatalism in Germany during the 
First World War' in Richard Wall and Jay Winter (eds.), The Upheaval of War: Family, Work and 
Welfare in Europe, 1914-1918, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 407. 
14 John R. Gillis, Louise A. Tilly, and David Levine, 'Introduction: The Quiet Revolution' in John R. 
Gillis, Louise A. Tilly, and David Levine (eds.), The European Experience of Declining Fertility, 
1850-1970: The Quiet Revolution, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1992, p. 3. 
15 Marie-Monique Russ, 'Pronatalism in the Inter-war Period in France', Journal of Contemporary 
History 25: 1 (1990), p. 40. 
16 Tamar Mayer, 'Gender Ironies ofNationalism: Setting the Stage' in Tamar Mayer, Gender Ironies of 
Nationalism: Sexing the Nation, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 7. 
They addressed the question of who should control reproduction- couples, or the 
state. 
4 
The first chapter of this study is concerned with how this natalist climate 
fostered an aversion to female individualism. Women's social duty, it was stressed, 
was to bear children for the nation. Anti-individualism is detected in discourse on the 
population problem, which rarely concerned itself with female individuals; in 
demographic and scientific/ medical discourse; and in legislation which revealed 
masculinist assumptions about woman's social role. The needs of the national 
community obliterated any question of female agency in matters pertaining to their 
own reproductive capacity. Moves to check depopulation were moves to bring 
women's fertility under state control. 
Depopulation was conceived as a moral problem, by its association with the 
'problem' of rising individualism. 18 Depopulation precipitated a fundamental clash of 
ideologies: individualism versus duty to the collective, 'egotism' versus sacrifice. 
In the post-Ibsen west, 'individualism' was a problem associated primarily with 
women. Demographers in the nineteenth century had contributed to this association 
of the new woman with selfish individualism. The French natalist and demographer 
Jacques Bertillon had observed in 1876 that "[French] wives are the least fertile" 
according to a marital fertility index that was the cornerstone of demographic studies 
because, he explained, "under the laws of society, only married women have been 
granted the privilege, or the duty, of producing children. "19 Statements like these 
revealed certain assumptions about woman's place and role in society, while 
reinforcing the pervasive conviction that women, in their selfish unwillingness to bear 
children- their crisis du devoir maternel- were responsible for depopulation.20 
17 Foucault noted the development of demography as a tool of this bio-power, in the realm of 
population controls: The History of Sexuality Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge, translated by Robert 
Hurley, London: Penguin, 1998, p. 140. 
18 Demographic theory stressed the concern of the urban bourgeoisie to advance their own self-interest 
over the interests of the nation as a primary cause of depopulation: see Joseph J. Spengler, France 
Faces Depopulation, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1938, pp. 156-60, and Mary 
Louise Roberts, Civilisation Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917-1927, 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 124-5. 
19 Bertillon calculated that for every 1000 married women aged between 15 and 50, 275 babies were 
born in Prussia, for example, compared to 173 in France: see J. H. Cole, '"There are Only Good 
Mothers": The Ideological Work ofWomen's Fertility in France before World War I,' French 
Historical Studies 19: 3 (1996), pp. 655-6. 
20 The natalist Gaston Rageot introduced the term 'crisis of maternal duty,' and said explicitly that ''the 
drop in natality is principally attributable to the French woman": quoted in Roberts, op.cit., p. 121-2. 
The possibility that women did not want to bear the pains of childbirth was expressed by 
5 
More thoughtful commentators recognised fertility decline as a consequence 
of significant cultural changes surrounding what both men and women expected from 
life. The editors of a recent work on fertility decline found it "impossible to separate 
biological from cultural production," because when people decide how many children 
to have, or decide not to reproduce themselves, they are simultaneously carving out 
their own identity in the world.21 The traditional fertility behaviour that Alfred 
Naquet of the Ligue de re-generation humaine described as "organic fatalism" could 
not survive alongside modernity.22 The debate over depopulation was not merely a 
reflection of renewed nationalist spirit and concerns for manpower after the war, but 
was intertwined with social, political and cultural transformations, anxieties 
concerning which were increasingly attaching themselves to the New Woman. 
The decline of a 'fatalistic' attitude towards individual fertility was associated 
with the rise of civilisation and the emergence of the 'modern' urban personality, 23 a 
theme which pervades the second chapter of this study. Writers attributed the spread 
of the desire to limit family size, the increased use of contraceptives, and the rise in 
abortions, to the urbanisation of the population. The massive shifts in population 
from the country to the city associated with the industrial revolution coincided -
roughly - with the decline in fertility. 24 The doctrine of rational control of individual 
fertility (the right to control one's own life) preached by urban 'types' with their 
subversive prioritising of individual desires, was viewed in opposition to the more 
'fatalistic' attitude of the country-dweller. The Princeton Fertility Project found that 
the size of a city bears a "consistent inverse relationship to the level of marital 
commentators: see Roberts, p. 121 and Lydia Kingsmill Commander, The American Idea, New York: 
Arno Press and the New York Times, 1972 (1907), pp. 152-6. 
21 Gillis et.al., 'Introduction: The Quiet Revolution,' p. 8. 
22 Quoted in Cole, op.cit., p. 661. 
23 
'Civilisation' theory in its various guises assumed that the modern 'mentality' made rational control 
of fertility inevitable, whereas the 'traditional' man would not have considered such control, as he 
viewed reproduction as an unalterable fact of existence. This influential idea, which saw changes in 
attitudes to childbearing in the nineteenth century as 'revolutionary,' was challenged by Angus 
McLaren, who argued that the 'Malthusian mentality' is in evidence throughout history and even 
prehistory, and that the modem contraceptive 'revolution' was a matter of an increase in the degree of 
control available and the percentage of the population employing these means of control. See his A 
History of Contraception: From Antiquity to the Present Day, Oxford: Blackwell, 1990, pp. 2-5. 
24 Ansley Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins (eds.), The Decline of Fertility in Europe: The Revised 
Proceedings of a Conference on the Princeton European Fertility Project, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986, p. 234. 
fertility."25 The largest 'world cities'- London, Paris, Berlin and New York- were, 
in terms of fecundity, the enemies ofthe national community.26 
Planning theory assumes that social processes are mirrored in spatial form. 
6 
The 'two spheres' paradigm of the bourgeois cosmos decreed domestic lives for 
women, while men led public lives in the civic space of the city, returning to the home 
outside the city when their day's business was done?7 Elizabeth Wilson, describing 
the urban woman as a 'sphinx'- suggesting inexplicability, inscrutability- describes 
a struggle waged over women's presence in urban space since the industrial 
revolution. Cities were not places for women, who were "an irruption in the city, a 
symptom of disorder, and a problem."28 The twenties is a crucial period in the study 
of gender and urban space, because of the increased presence of hitherto respectable 
women in the streets of cities. 
The cultural, social and economic conditions of the large city, where new 
moral and ethical conditions were at their most intense, offered women the 
opportunity to live a 'larger life' outside biological determinism?9 In the 1920s, 
greater numbers of women were taking advantage of the potentialities of the city. An 
increase in female white-collar work during the war made young, single women more 
visible in cities, where they also inhabited space for the purposes of leisure and 
commerce. 
25Coale and Watkins, op.cit., p. 254. 
26 The rise of the 'world-city,' in which Oswald Spengler envisaged people losing their national 
identities to become 'generic urbanites,' dramatised a confrontation of rational, individualistic society 
and the 'organic' community, symbolised in the rural-urban division. See Oswald Spengler, The 
Decline of the West, translated by Charles Francis Atkinson, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939 (Vol. I 
1918, Vol. II 1922), Vol. II, pp. 87-110. 'World-city' was the term used to describe large metropolises 
with international influence: the name itself implied the erasing of national characteristics within the 
urban space. 
27 The division between the home and civic space reflected and reinforced a definition of woman that 
aligned her with the sensuous, with feeling rather than reason and intellect, which were qualities 
associated with the man and public life. Genevieve Lloyd described this sexual division of mental 
labour: "Woman's task is to preserve the sphere of the intermingling of mind and body, to which the 
Man of Reason will repair for solace, warmth and relaxation. If he is to exercise the most exalted form 
of Reason, he must leave soft emotions and sensuousness behind; woman will keep them intact for 
him": The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, London: Routledge, 1984, p. 
50. 
28 Elizabeth Wilson, The Sphinx in the City: Urban Life, the Control of Disorder, and Women, 
California: University of California Press, 1995, pp. 16 and 9. 
29 The appeal to 'nature' to justify male domination, discussed above, in turn created the familiar 
classification of woman's destiny as biological event: see Helen Callaway, "The Most Essentially 
Female Function of All': Giving Birth' in Shirley Ardener (ed.), Defining Females: The Nature of 
Women in Society, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978, and Germaine Greer, Sex and Destiny: The 
Politics of Human Fertility, Melbourne: Seeker and Warburg, 1984. 
7 
The apparent increase of female presence on the streets of cities was 
disturbing on a number of levels. The single woman working in the city had escaped 
patriarchal relations, and was not disciplined by motherhood. She was literally 'her 
own woman.' Adrienne Rich, writing in 1977, was frustrated by the lack of a 
satisfactory word to describe a woman who defines herself neither in relation to 
children nor to a man: a woman who is "self-identified, who has chosen herself."30 
Such a woman could not be conceived in a world which still defined women in terms 
of their duties to others. Chapter Two of this study considers the flapper as urban 
'sphinx,' staging an actual and symbolic rebellion against the maternal role by her 
presence in the city. It considers the 'world-cities,' though the flapper was to be 
found throughout the urban West: the largest cities, it is suggested, offered women the 
'largest life.' 
This study is very much concerned with the blurring of lines between the lives 
of men and women and the spaces they occupied. The separation of sexuality from 
procreation, made possible by birth control and its diffusion, collapsed vital 
boundaries. In Emile Zola's novel Fecondite (1899), Dr. Boutan had warned that 
contraception opened up the possibility of a "sexual and ultimately social agency for 
women outside the conventional realm ofmotherhood."31 The Neo-Malthusian 
movement was considered subversive because it had attempted to dismantle the social 
significance of woman's reproductive function. This was an extremely radical notion. 
Madeleine Pelletier argued in 1908 that, "It is obvious that women are not 
anatomically identical to men, but that is the individual's concern and has nothing to 
do with society."32 
Modernity saw 'all that is solid melt into air' as Marshall Berman titled his 
classic work. 33 This was especially true with regard to the balance between the 
masculine and feminine principles. Mary Louise Roberts found in the case of France 
that the perceived collapse of distinctions between the sexes was a "primary referent" 
in cultural pessimism after the Great War.34 The postwar period witnessed a crisis 
30 Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution, London: Virago, 1977, 
p. 249. 
31 Quoted in Cole, op.cit., p. 641. 
32 Ibid., p. 662. 
33 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity, New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1982. 
34 Roberts, op.cit., p. 4. 
concerning gender identity. The flapper seemed to arouse unacknowledged fears of 
cultural collapse due to her visible rejection of those hallmarks of womanhood that 
were inextricable from motherhood as constructed by men: altruism, domesticity, 
subservience. 
8 
The blurring of boundaries between the roles and behaviours of the sexes is an 
important theme of Chapter Three. The flapper wanted to be the comrade of men, to 
claim their freedoms and live on equal terms with them, and she dispensed with many 
of the conventions of femininity to do so. The flapper said less than her critics- she 
did not write great feminist manifestos. She 'spoke' with her style, and left records of 
her behaviour in imagery. The ideological importance of dress is assumed in this 
study. The flapper made a statement through fashion which was invested with 
political meaning. The ideal of 1900 in feminine dress, which emphasisised secondary 
sexual characteristics, was completely eclipsed by 1920, relaced by straight, 'boyish' 
lines. Fashion attracted disproportionate attention in the period, as it was interpreted 
as a visual language expressing changes in gender relations. 
The response to the flapper was heated, because her style and behaviour were 
read as a rejection of maternity. The flapper has been dismissed by much feminism 
and historiography as having no politically serious agenda. But she threatened 
traditional notions of female identity. Opposition to the flapper was informed by 
awareness of a decline in fertility, but the refusal of young women to bear children 
was a problem that went deeper than the threat of 'depopulation.' The flapper had 
embarked on an individualistic quest for a new way of being a woman. This required 
a rejection of the maternal capacity and the sphere- space- that went with it. In this 
natalist climate that demanded women be defined by their biological function, which 
was conceived as a social duty, the flapper embraced the 'anti-maternal' values 
associated with the city and modern life, in a strong assertion ofher explicit, 
individual self-subsistence, her personhood. 
9 
Chapter 1 
The price of woman is the child: 
fertility decline, the nation, and duty. 
"[a] country whose women do not know how to produce children is a country struck 
at its very heart." (Senator Leon Jenouvrier, France 1919)1 
You're going to make a lovely little mother 
You're going to make a bunch of cannonfodder 
That's what your belly's for 
And that's no news to you 
And now do not squall 
You're having a baby, that's all. 
(Bertolt Brecht, 1929)2 
Nineteenth-century scientific thought invested women with a crucial 
evolutionary role. Herbert Spencer warned in his Principles of Biology (1867) that 
women would lose their capacity for reproduction as they gained in self-sufficiency 
and individualism.3 The continuance of the human race, in this view, depended upon 
female dependence and self-abnegation, which must be fostered at all costs. The 
"recredescence of primitive individualism" festering in the New Woman was blamed 
for the decline of the Victorian family and morality, the linchpin of which had been 
the 'Cult of True Womanhood' as Welter described it, a cult that saw womanhood 
defined by altruistic devotion to the service of another, a la Louisa May Alcott.4 The 
cultivation of self-abnegation, sacrifice, duty- this was the woman's biologically 
determined evolutionary task. But by 1910 Margaret Deland would observe, "The 
1 Quoted in Roberts, op.cit., p. 120. 
2 Quoted in Atina Grossmann, 'Abortion and Economic Crisis: The 1931 Campaign against Paragraph 
218' in Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman, and Marion Kaplan (eds.), When Biology Became Destiny: 
Women in Weimar and Nazi Germany, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984, pp. 66-7. 
3 Quoted in David M. Kennedy, Birth Control in America: the Career of Margaret Sanger, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970, p. 47. 
4 Ibid., p. 37; Barbara Welter, 'The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860', American Quarterly 18, 
(1966),pp.151-174. 
young woman of today is supplementing a certain old-fashioned word, duty, by two 
other words, "to myself.""5 
10 
By the time of the emergence oflbsen's and Bernard Shaw's 'new woman' 
from the 1880s onwards, it was clear that women in 'developed' countries were 
having fewer children. Between 1850 and 1930 there was a near-universal decline in 
birth rates across Europe, by as much as 50 percent,6 while the United States had 
experienced a steady decline since at least 1820 (figures 1 and 2).7 The 'demographic 
transition' refers, in very general terms, to the shift from a traditional pattern of high 
birth rates offset by high mortality, to the modern pattern oflowbirth rates offset by 
low mortality. 8 It is usually conflated with urbanisation and industrialisation, the 
other great transformations of the period. 
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Fig. t: Crude Birth Rates for France, England and \Vales, and 
Germany 
5 Margaret Deland, 'The Change in the Feminine Ideal,' The Atlantic Monthly Vol. CV, (March 191 0), 
p. 293. 
6 Teitelbaum, The British Fertility Decline, p. 3. 
7 Kennedy, op.cit., p. 42. 
8 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire 1875-1914, London: Abacus, 1997, p. 193. The theory of 
demographic transition was formulated in the 1920s and 30s and dominated the study of demographic 
decline until recent decades. Transition theory assumed that all societies would gradually come under 
the sway of 'modem' forces, so that it was possible to predict future demographic developments 
elsewhere in the world. It saw advances in technology and science from the eighteenth century leading 
to a rise in living standards and medical care which reduced mortality, but argued that emerging 
lifestyles associated with industrialisation and urbanisation would reduce the demand for children: 
given, for example, their reduced economic usefulness in the cities. Furthermore, people living in 
11 
Demographers in the age of the New Woman and beyond, as Sogner has 
observed, studied population conditions "at a level of abstraction where women as 
such seem hardly more interesting than men as such": women being as conspicuously 
absent from works of demography as from traditional historiography, which also 
concerned itself with demography only as it impacted on the nation and state. 9 
Late nineteenth-century demography, despite its 'scientific' tone, presented 
reproduction as a social responsibility through an "overdetermined connection 
between womanhood and motherhood."10 The fertility index was defined as a ratio of 
births to the total population of women of 'childbearing age': a notion that presumes 
womanhood to be defined by biological destiny .11 Under the Malthusian paradigm, a 
cities would be presented with alternatives to the family-oriented lifestyle: see George Alter, 'Theories 
of Fertility Decline: A Non-Specialist's Guide to the Current Debate' in Gillis, et.al., op.cit., pp. 15-20. 
9 S. Sogner, 'Historical Features ofWomen's Position in Society' in Federici, et.al., op.cit., p. 245. 
Historians concerning themselves with demography have similarly discussed the problem of the birth 
rate purely in terms of national concerns and without reference to women's lives: John C. Hunter, in his 
article on the French government's prioritising of 'the principle of equality'- which held that all men 
should serve in the army for the same period, even if they had fathered large families - over both the 
amelioration of the birth rate and an improved defence on the eve of the First World War, did not 
mention women, though his argument was centrally concerned with the French aspiration to create "a 
society based on the equality of all citizens." See 'The Problem of the French Birth Rate on the Eve of 
World War I', French Historical Studies 2 (1962), pp. 490-503. 
1
° Cole, op.cit., p. 646. 
11 Ibid. 
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more gender-neutral process for measuring fertility had prevailed, in which fertility 
had been measured in relation to couples. The end of the Malthusian era in 
demographic studies saw the Scottish gynaecological surgeon J. Matthews Duncan 
make the gendered distinction between fertility and fecundity: fertility being the 
number of children produced by the population, and fecundity indicating the 
reproductive potential of individual women's bodies. This endorsed a view that saw 
fecundity as carrying with it a responsibility to be fertile. 12 But the 'modem woman,' 
the ultimate symbol of the social problem of' egotism', would brook no interference 
with her newfound perception of a responsibility to herself 
The demographic transition was characterised by the virtual demise of the 
large family in all wealthy countries. The case of Great Britain, where marriages in 
1925 were dominated by one and two child families (figure 3) and childlessness had 
doubled in frequency since 1870, was typical of other industrialised nations.13 
Fertility decline was 'led' by the middle and upper classes in a revolutionary change 
in reproductive behaviour occurring in France and the United States from the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and in France and Germany from the late 
nineteenth century. 14 
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Fig. 3: Shrinldng fanlily size in Great Britain 
12 Ibid., p. 651. 
13 In nineteenth-century Britain families of five or more children had constituted three-fifths of all 
families. Queen Victoria had nine children in eighteen years, and an average of six children prevailed 
until the 1880s. The rapidity of the change is also illustrated in the case of Great Britain: for couples 
marrying during the war and in the 1920s, one or two children was the norm in 45 to 50 percent of 
cases, whereas this kind of small family had represented only 12.5 percent of marriages in the 1870s. 
Even by the period 1900-1909 a third of all marriages had produced only one or two children. See D. 
V. Glass and E. Grebenik, Papers of the Royal Commission on Population Volume VI: The Trend and 
Pattern of Fertility in Great Britain, Part 1, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1954, p. 3, and 
Richard Allen Soloway, Birth Control and the Population Question in England, 1877-1930, Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982, p. 8. The trend towards smaller families was also 
marked in Germany: whereas in 1910 one third of the population had lived in a family of no more than 
four people, by 1933 over half the population did so. See T. Mason, 'Women in Germany, 1925-1940: 
Family, Welfare and Work, Part I', History Workshop 1 (1976), p. 82. But the 'small-family system' 
was primarily associated with France: the average French family of 1914 consisted of just two children, 
compared to 2.5 in Great Britain and 3 in Germany: see Robert A. Nye, Masculinity and Male Codes of 
Honor in Modern France, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 78. 
13 
France was exceptional, in that an early onset of fertility decline, before 1830, 
had seen the annual net reproduction rate fall below the level theoretically required 
for a population to replace itself as early as 1890. It was to remain at this level almost 
constantly unti11946. The French population, which had grown by 32 percent in the 
period 1801-1850, grew by only 14.6 percent between 1850 and 1914. 15 By the 1930s 
most of the North, West and Central European populations were similarly reproducing 
themselves at a level near or below replacement, fertility having plunged with 
"remarkable simultaneity and speed."16 Such a transition, occurring across a period 
that also saw the emergence of a feminism constantly linked in public discourse to the 
"specter of women's individualism," sparked fears regarding an apparent rejection of 
the maternal role amongst 'new women.' 17 
Depopulation was finnly embedded in the public consciousness by 1914. In 
1913 The Times reflected "the public .. .is accustomed to the headline in the general 
press, 'The Declining Birthrate,' and to the announcement which is made by the 
Registrar-General with almost mathematical regularity that 'this is the lowest rate 
since registration began."' 18 The proceedings of the National Birth-Rate Commission 
in Great Britain were well publicised during the war, as were the publications of its 
prominent leader, James Marchant, who published Cradles or Coffins: Our Greatest 
National Need, in 1916.19 
In France, where the censuses of 1890, 1891, 1892 and 1895 had revealed an 
excess of deaths over births, Jacques Bertillon formed the Alliance nationale pour 
l 'accroissement de la population frant;aise (1896) to lobby for policies to remedy the 
problem. By 1910 Robert Hertz commented that you could not open a French 
14 See Michael R. Haines, 'Occupation and Social Class during Fertility Decline: Historical 
Perspectives' in Gillis et.al., op.cit., pp. 193-226. 
15 G. Wright, France in Modern Times: From the Enlightenment to the Present, third edition, New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1981, p. 180 and 277; Etienne Van de Walle, The Female Population of France 
in the Nineteenth Century, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 3-5. 
16 J. E. Knodel, The Decline of Fertility in Germany, 1871-1939, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974, p. 3; Gillis, et.al., 'Introduction: 'The Quiet Revolution' in Gillis et.al, p. 1. 
17 Bell and Offen, op.cit., p. 17. 
18 Quoted by James Marchant, 'Preface,' The Declining Birth Rate: Its Causes and Effects, Second 
Edition, London: Chapman and Hall, 1917, p. v. 
19 James Marchant, Cradles or Coffins: Our Greatest National Need, London: C. Arthur Pearson Ltd., 
1916. 
newspaper or review without finding an article about the depopulation of the 
country.20 
14 
The Great War was to raise these anxieties to a fever pitch in France, where 
the demographic problem was the most marked. The death or wounding of five 
million men- eight million had been mobilised- saw anxieties about population 
carve out a position of high visibility in the political agenda. The Alliance reached a 
national audience shocked by the demographic impact of the war, and 1919 saw the 
establishment by the French government of the Conseil superieur de Ia natalite.21 
In countries other than France the decline had been masked for a few decades 
by a steeper decline in the death rate, so that fertility decline failed to pervade general 
public consciousness until the war highlighted issues of manpower. Germany's defeat 
in the war sharpened anxieties about the 'defeat' implicit in its own 
Geburtenriickgang or fertility decline, which had been rapid: by the census of 1933 its 
national fertility rate was one-half what it had been at the turn of the century. The 
German birth rate was the lowest in Europe by this time. 22 In the United States 
anxiety about fertility decline focused on the nativist notion of 'race suicide.' The 
dying out of the Anglo-Saxon element in American society, the "last 100 percent 
American Adam ... and Eve,"23 was a constant theme of the general anxiety regarding 
the falling birth rate in the United States. 24 
Fertility became integral to the rhetoric of war: European and American 
politicians alike struck fear into the hearts of their electors by lamenting Germany's 
victory in the 'warfare of the cradle. ' 25 Even given the technological innovations that 
characterised battle by the time of the Great War, notions of a strong population being 
the source of military strength played an important part in pronatalist rhetoric. 
Germany boasted a population of 65 million to France's 39.5 million, and according 
2
° Cole, op.cit., p. 663 and 640. 
21 Andres Horacio Reggiani, 'Procreating France: The Politics of Demography, 1919-1945,' French 
Historical Studies 19: 3 (1996), p. 731-2. 
22 Grossmann, Reforming Sex, p. 4. 
23 Katherine Anthony, 'TI1e Family' in Harold E. Steams (ed.), Civilisation in the United States: An 
Inquiry by Thirty Americans, New York: Brace and Company, 1970 (1922), p. 320. 
24 See John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925, New York: 
Atheneum, 1975. Theodore Roosevelt's 1905-9 campaign for fecundity, in which he used the idea of 
'race suicide' to argue against birth control, popularised Francis A. Walker's theory that immigration 
discouraged reproduction amongst the older stock: p. 147. Nativism combined decisively with 
anxieties about fertility decline in the 1920s. Edward A. Ross wrote of the "Slow Suicide among Our 
Native Stock" in 1924: Dorothy M. Brown, Setting a Course: American Women in the 1920s, Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1987, p. 115. 
25 Theodore Roosevelt, quoted in Kennedy, op.cit., p. 43. 
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to the 1911 census France, once the second largest population in Europe, had been 
surpassed by Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Britain, and was being 
approached by Italy.26 After the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1) there had been a 
reluctance to reproduce, and by 1911 the French population had increased by only 9.7 
percent, in comparison to Germany's 57.8 percent.27 The demographer Paul Haury 
claimed that the essential cause of the war had been Germany's perception of France 
as a "dying nation. "28 Despite French perceptions of Germany's manpower as 
superior (figure 4), between 1870 and 1930 Germany's own crude birth rate had 
declined by more than 50 percent, making Germans similarly nervous about the 
relative Volkskraft (population strength) of their enemies, particularly Russia, which 
boasted the highest birthrate in Europe. 29 
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Fig. 4: Milital'ism and the birth rate: 'One of the profound causes of the 
present war bas been our low birthrate• 
While civilised nations feared each other, they also betrayed a collective 
nervousness about the possibility that the decadence of civilisation (the decline was 
likened to the process that had seen the fall of Rome and Greece) would lead to the 
supremacy of more prolific 'savages': that the decline of the birth rate in Western 
countries might forebode the "transfer of power to the yellow and black races of 
26 C. Dyer, Population and Society in Twentieth Century France, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978, 
pp. 5-7; Hunter, op.cit., p. 491. 
27 France's defeat in 1870-71 was blamed by government officials on the declining population: see 
Roberts, op.cit., p. 99; Dyer, op.cit., p. 5. Germany's increase was overwhelmingly due to territorial 
gains. 
28 Roberts, op.cit., pp. 105-7. 
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mankind."3° Fertility decline was inextricable from perceptions of a generalised 
cultural, political and economic decline: the degeneration of civilised countries 
attested to in Spengler's Decline of the West. 31 Depopulation provided a coherent 
explanation for the crises of the post-war years, and presented contemporaries with a 
clear goal: the healing ofthe moral disease that was the key to all the nation's 
problems.32 This ideological linkage between population and national strength was 
deeply ingrained in culture and was the central tenet of pronatalism. 33 Henri Cheron, 
addressing the French Senate in 1920, described propaganda for abortion and 
contraception as "propaganda against French natality, that is, against the nation."34 
29 Knodel, op.cit., p. 4; Cornelie Usborne, 1"he Politics of the Body: Women's Reproductive Rights and 
Duties, London: Macmillan, 1992, p. 16. 
3
° For example, Sir Leo Chiozza Money, The Peril of the White, London: W. Collins Sons and Co., 
1923; C. E. Pell, 'The Fertility Question' in Raymond Pierpoint (ed.), Report of the Fifth International 
Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference, London: William Heinemann, 1922, p. 257; Sir Arthur 
Newsholme, 'Some Public Health Aspects of Birth Control' in James Marchant (ed.), Medical Views 
on Birth Control, London: Martin Hopkinson, 1926, p. 132. Commander had in 1907 compared the 
United States in its youth and vigour to "womout civilisations of the past in their last cycles of 
existence," speaking of France by implication when she described a low birth rate as a symptom of "the 
decreptitude of national decay, the senility of national old age": op.cit., pp. 70 and 76. 
31 Spengler argued that all civilisations enter a stage of depopulation, a symptom of a degeneration 
which begins in the cities and leads to the collapse of nations: Spengler, The Decline of the West, p. 
105 and passim. Images of France as a sick or dying body were a commonplace of natalist rhetoric, 
which held a crucial place in a wider discourse regarding social degeneration: Roberts, op. cit., pp. 107-
8, 111. Similar images of decay and degeneration were used to describe the Volk 'body' which was 
seen to be suffering the effects of a loss of youth and vigour: a third of the population had been aged 
under 15 years in 1910, but only a quarter by 1925 (Grossmann, Reforming Sex, op.cit., p. 6). On 
degeneration see Daniel Pick, Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 1848-1918, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, and for France, William H. Schneider, Quality and 
Quantity: The Quest for Biological Regeneration in Twentieth Century France, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990, especially ch.1. This contemporary tendency among conservatives to align 
fertility decline with wider national malaise became a historiographical commonplace: see, for 
example, Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
32 Roberts, op.cit., p. 117. 
33 British pro-natalists believed that depopulation would affect production, the growth of capital and 
investments, employment, and wages -and that "we shall be the spectators of the enrichment and 
prosperity of our neighbours" as the President of The League of National Life foreboded in his address, 
'The Disastrous Influence of a Declining Birth Rate on the Life of the Nation', Croydon: Roffey and 
Clark Ltd., 1929, p. 8. Other approaches to the population problem did not see the progress and power 
of nations in such numerical tem1s: the neo-Malthusian and eugenics movements also indicated the 
new tendency to treat sexuality as the business of the state, but were more concerned with the 'quality' 
and health of the population than with sheer numbers. Birth control was increasingly recognised as a 
tool in enhancing eugenic quality. After 1920 Margaret Sanger's focus had shifted from her initial 
radical position- birth control as a means of freeing the working class from exploitation- to a position 
that appealed more to the middle class: contraception as a means of social control, to eliminate the 
'unfit' (see Kennedy, op.cit., pp. 113-122 on Sanger and the eugenic and nativist movements in 
America in the 1920s). In Britain it was hoped that birth control clinics would have a eugenic effect. 
By 1928 Norman E. Himes despaired that the clinics had "been unable to reach the feeble-minded, the 
insane and epeleptic, the chronic paupers, and persistent leaners upon the state," but observed that they 
had, however, succeeded in causing family limitation among the "dull normals": see 'British Birth 
Control Clinics: Some Results and Eugenic Aspects of their Work,' Eugenics Review 20 (1928), p. 157. 
34 Roberts, op.cit., pp. 113-14. 
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The notion of pregnancy as the woman's active service was a commonplace of 
wartime rhetoric: in a 1915 German pamphlet the prominent Social Democrat Alfred 
Grotjahn suggested that reproduction was the "only female contribution to war and 
military power which equals ... men's wartime national service."35 German women 
were pushed to bear more children as a "moral and patriotic duty," as stated in the 
preamble to a proposed bill to limit the legal grounds on which women could obtain 
an abortion. 36 A French wartime postcard depicted a smiling, pregnant woman 
wearing a helmet in her own form of mobilisation (figure 5).37 In 1905 Theodore 
Roosevelt had insisted that those who rejected the "blessing of children" merited the 
same contempt as "the soldier who runs away in battle."38 
Fig. 5: Pregnancy as wome,n"s national service: 
•come on ladies. Wm·k fow· France.' 
35 Us borne, 'Pregnancy is the woman's active service,' p. 389. 
36 Ibid., p. 393. 
37 Huss, 'Pronatalism and the popular ideology of the child,' pp. 343-45. 
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The price of woman is the child 
During and after the Great War natalist rhetoric linked soldiery and 
motherhood as differently gendered versions of duty, of imp6t du sang, or blood 
tribute, to the state. 39 Even H. L. Mencken drew the comparison: "The woman who 
has not had a child remains incomplete, ill at ease and more than a little ridiculous. 
She is in the position of a man who has never stood in battle; she has missed the most 
colossal experience of her sex."40 The bearing of children was a woman's civic duty 
and, in this context, a kind of reparation for male sacrifice during the war. To 'give 
one's life' and 'to give life' were powerfully connected. Roberts has noted how 
arguments for natality were "framed within the ordeal of war": there was emotive 
cultural force to arguments that "it will be in vain that our sons will have been 
killed."41 Women stand for passive immutability and stability in the national project, 
rather than progress, and provide a background against which men - in war, for 
example- determine the fate of the nation.42 
Roberts has detailed the resentment of veterans at women's apparent rejection 
of the values for which the war was said to have been fought: honour, duty, devotion, 
and self-abnegation. The perceived frivolity of the homefront - especially large cities 
- was contrasted to the horrors of the front. In 191 7 the dramatist Abel Hermant 
wrote, "For us and History, this is the year of the war; for them, the year of short 
skirts."43 Female rejection of 'her side of the bargain' was intolerable in this climate. 
38 Quoted in Bell and Offen, pp. 138-9. 
39 Roberts, op.cit., pp. 90 and 143. 
40 H. L. Mencken, In Defence of Women, London: Jonathan Cape, 1923, p. 85. 
41 Roberts, op.cit., pp. 117 and 110. It has been argued that a nation's perception of its population 
becomes particularly crucial after a war, and scholars of 'nation' have recognised the tendency to 
perceive women's bodies as markers of the health of the nation, especially in so far as women's bodies 
represent the 'purity' of the nation, and therefore need to be protected and/or controlled. See Rachel G. 
Fuchs, 'Introduction,' French Historical Studies 19: 3 (1996): forum on 'Population and the State in 
the Third Republic,' p. 633, and Mayer, op.cit., pp. 1-22. The war, with its attendant anxieties about 
emasculation, brought a need for assurance of national virility, and for the soothing and procreative 
qualities associated with women. Politicians and pro-natal groups stressed the responsibility of women 
to the health of the nation, la mere de famille nombreuse or prolific mother operating as a symbol of 
rebirth and redemption after the trauma of war, as Roberts has shown in the case of France (op.cit., p. 
91 and 129-131 ). The French natalist propagandist Paul Bureau called for the creation of a society 
"oriented towards life" in the wake of so much death: ibid., p. 127. 
42 Mayer, op.cit., p. 10; George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal 
Sexuality in Modern Europe, New York: Howard Fertig, 1985, p. 18. 
43 Roberts, op.cit., p. 74. 
In France Leon Jenouvrier accused those wanting to 'live their own life' of 
selfishness, pointing out that the soldiers of France had not tried to 'live their own 
life' but had given their lives.44 In the postwar period, the task of the woman was to 
relinquish her individual life- her self-subsistence- in order to create life. In 1918, 
two Frenchmen who described themselves as feminists asserted that "the child is 
woman's only raison d'etre."45 
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In post-war rebuilding, women were to bind the wounds of nations with their 
mothering, nurturing qualities. In 1918 the wife ofFriedrich Naumann listed the 
priorities women should embrace in the New Germany: 1) to avoid depopulation; 2) 
to maintain national unity; 3) to make the people's state a pleasant place for all; 4) to 
improve public school education; 5) to maintain Germanic traditions and high health 
standards; and 5) to feel oneself to be a German citizen.46 The last proscription 
seemed, by implication, to be contingent on the other duties. During the war 
propaganda against the woman worker in France had similarly suggested this 
balancing of rights and duties for the woman: 
"The rights of women increase. But what is their great duty: to give 
birth, to give birth again, always to give birth ... should a woman 
refuse to give bitih she no longer deserves her rights ... the price of 
woman is the child. Childless by choice, she falls to the rank of the 
prostitute, the whore whose organs are only instruments, obscene 
playthings, instead of remaining the venerable matrix of all the future 
centuries."47 
It was from within the birth control movement and the women's movement 
that questions had arisen regarding the motives of the state in its desire for more 
births.48 The war effort was constantly conflated with the effort to repopulate France 
(figure 6). 
44 Ibid., p. 120. 
45 Russ, 'Pronatalism and the popular ideology of the child,' p. 330. 
46Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, 'Beyond Kinder, Kuche, Kirche: Weimar Women in Politics 
and Work' in Bridenthal et.al., p. 42. 
47Quoted in James F. McMillan, Housewife or Harlot: the Place of Women in French Society 1870-
1940, New York: St Martins Press, 1981, pp. 191-2. 
48 States appealed to the need for manpower in the event of a future war, to justify the treatment of 
individual sexual behaviour as a legitimate object of social control. However, if a high population was 
the best chance of success in the next war, then the best guarantee of peace would be the adoption of 
20 
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birth control, as the neo-Malthusian Reverend Gordon Lang argued: see 'The Moral and Religious 
Aspects of Birth Control' in Report of the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control 
Conference, p. 183. Pacifism was, of course, a radical position in this militaristic climate. Cicely 
Hamilton and others posed questions as to the underlying motives of natalist rhetoric when they argued 
that under conditions of modem, technological warfare, a large population was no guarantee of victory 
and could be more of an impediment than a strength: Cicely Hamilton, 'The Cannon Fodder Argument' 
in Report of the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference, pp. 184-6. Helene 
Stocker, calling herself a 'radical pacifist', felt compelled to proclaim in 1922 that the state, for whom 
so many had died to defend, was "no God or idol": Amy Hackett, 'Helene Stocker: Left-Wing 
Intellectual and Sex Reformer' in Bridenthal et.al., p. 124. This kind of scepticism about 'national 
needs' was also implicit in the arguments of socialists and others that the state, if it wanted children, 
should pay for them. In opposing the passage of the 1920 natalist measures in the Chambre des . 
deputes in France, the socialist delegate Andre Berthon said that "in order to have numerous children, 
one must first be able to feed them. Society must give assistance to single mothers, organise domestic 
assistance, and provide leaves of absence during pregnancy and after birth": Roberts, op.cit., p. 93. 
Stella Browne spoke for poor women: "If you have done this to our children, and if you can only offer 
them slavery and starvation, you shall have no more": Stella Browne, 'The Feminine Aspect of Birth 
Control' in Report of the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference, p. 42. 
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Georges Clemenceau argued that even if all the armaments in Germany were taken 
away, the French would be lost militarily if they renounced the large family because 
"there won't be any more French people."49 State warnings that a low birthrate was 
suicide in military terms, and the constant aligning of depopulation with the threat of 
national peril, had not gone unnoticed in popular consciousness in France. A picture 
postcard imagined 'poilu-growing' after the war, humorously depicted the rearing of 
'cannon fodder' like crops of cabbages (figure 7).50 In 1916 Helen StOcker, president 
of Germany's League for the Protection ofMotherhood, denounced the state's 
insistence that women "bear live munition."51 
Fig. 7: • After th~ war: 
poilu-growing' 
France suffered the highest proportional casualty rate in the war, with 16.5 
percent of those mobilised killed, compared to 14.7 percent in Germany. 52 In 1919 
the prominent French natalist Gaston Rageot contended that French women should 
"make it a point of honour to conquer German women in peacetime, just as their 
husbands and brothers conquered German men during the war. Now it is their 
tum!"53 Certain women, however, had seen what came of a masculine obsession with 
'honour,' and were unwilling to devote their bodies and freedoms to the men who had 
led their countries to war. 
The moral problem of the excessive individualism of postwar society was 
constantly lamented by natalists. A pervasive "love of well-being, an unwillingness 
49 Roberts, op.cit., p. 90. 
50 Russ, 'Pronatalism and the popular ideology of the child,' p. 345. 'Poilu' was the standard term for 
the French soldier during World War I: it means hairy, ie. virile: Buss, n. p. 359. Other cards depicted 
babies in uniforms, or school-age children with weapons, in response to the discussion of the 'depleted 
cohorts' that men born between 1915-18, (when births fell to a new low) would form when they turned 
20: ibid., pp. 345-353. 
51 Usbome, 'Pregnancy is the woman's active service', p. 399. 
52Roberts, op.cit., p. 95. 
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to sacrifice any of one's comforts and amusements, a growing need for luxury, vanity, 
a fear of complicating one's life," was a failing increasingly associated with bourgeois 
modem women. 54 A new awareness of the decline in fertility saw a surge in anti-
individualist attitudes to women, just as certain young women displayed a terror of 
how childbearing might rob them of their individual identities and tum them into 
sentimental, unseemly blobs who "think in terms of milk, oatmeal, nurse, [and] 
diapers."55 One French woman wrote, "Now we just want to live our own 
lives ... without worrying about the fate of future generations."56 However, in this 
pervasively natalist post-war climate women were encouraged to view their lives 
within the narrow confines of what the nation needed of them: their reproductive 
capacity. 
The conditions of the period led to a denigration of women as mere baby-
making machines. Hausen noted that German women were addressed as individuals 
even less frequently than formerly. 57 Medical discourse, which decisively influenced· 
government policy in all countries where depopulation was discussed, stressed the 
maternal function as the natural fulfillment of womanhood, and warned of the tragic 
consequences of its perversion.58 In natalist ideology, a woman's body had no 
integrity of its own apart from its maternal capacity- as the "repositories of future 
generations" as Zola's Dr. Boutan in Fecondite (1899) had put it- a capacity which in 
this period was defined as a social function. 59 
While 'individualism' was highly prized in the United States as the central 
feature of a free life of liberty, apparently this applied to men only. Theodore 
Roosevelt had denounced the submission of some women to "coldness, to selfishness, 
53 Ibid., p. 90. 
54 Paul Bureau, the natalist propagandist, quoted in Roberts, op.cit., p. 125. 
55 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Beautiful and Damned, London: Penguin, 1988 (1922), p. 124. 
56 Quoted in Roberts, op. cit., p. 139. 
57 Karin Hausen, 'Mothers Day in the Weimar Republic' in Bridenthal, et.al., p. 148. 
58 A standard Medical text even in 1925 warned of the dangers of the 'maternal instinct driven 
inwards,' linking the bearing of children to female bodily and mental health: see Barbara Brookes, 'The 
illegal operation: abortion, 1919-39' in London Feminist History Group, The Sexual Dynamics of 
History: Men's Power, Women's Resistance, London: Pluto Press, 1983, p. 169. Doctors warned that 
fertility control in the earlier years of marriage could lead to later inability to conceive, and suggested 
that coitus interruptus caused neurasthenia in women: see Arthur E. Giles, 'Birth Control' in James 
Marchant (ed.), Medical Views on Birth Control, London: Martin Hopkinson, 1926, pp. 85-7, and 
Octavius Charles Beale, Racial Decay: A Compilation of Evidence from World Sources, Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1910, pp. 206-217. Comelie Usbome has noted that even 'progressive' Weimar 
policy- noted for its promise of sexual equality- tended to assume the primacy of women's maternal 
role over all others: The Politics of the Body, p. 53. 
59 Roberts, p. 121; Zola quoted in Cole, op.cit., p. 641. 
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to love of ease, to shrinking from risk ... " in his strictures on 'race suicide. ' 60 An 
English doctor warned that the effect of a "deliberate refusal to accept the 
responsibilities of parenthood" would be that qualities of patience, gentleness and care 
of others would "be shrivelled up through disuse."61 This selfishness, this slavishness 
to the "brazen cult of self' was blamed for the divorce rate, the surge in abortions, and 
other social evils. 62 Mother's Day was instituted in France in 1920 and Germany in 
1923 as a celebration of female self-abnegation. 63 Men determined the social 
construction of motherhood by these means, just as they controlled maternity and 
population policy. After 1925 the German Mother's Day holiday was presented as a 
day of instruction which would "raise the consciousness of all women to their 
maternal responsibilities and duties."64 
Discourse on population rarely concerned itself with the individual: fertility 
decline in this militaristic climate was conceived as an issue of national health and 
defence, rather than as a private matter concerning the needs and decisions of 
individual women and couples. Nelly Roussel marvelled of French legislators that 
"this gang of grotesque actors posing as moralists have found a way of composing 
their long harangues without speaking of women and of mothers! . .. These gentlemen 
may want children, but they don't seem to know how they are made!"65 There had 
been no woman present at the first extraparliamentary commission on the question in 
France in 1902, which ultimately led to the repressive legislation of 1920.66 
The effects of the war, and the perception of demographic crisis, gave states 
an opportunity to intervene in personal decisions regarding family and sexuality. In 
Germany in 1916 the Prussian Minister of Justice had urged state prosecutors to 
'punish with severity' women who underwent abortions and to 'suppress their natural 
sympathy' in such cases. Three repressive 1918 bills, prevented from becoming law 
only by the interruption of revolution in Germany, completely subordinated the rights 
of individual women to the requirements of the state. One of the bills, which limited 
60 Quoted in Kennedy, op.cit., p. 47. 
61 Giles, op.cit., p. 85. 
62 Kennedy, op.cit., p. 48. 
63 Roberts, op.cit., p. 129. 
64 Usborne, The Politics of the Body, p. 63. 
65 Roberts, op.cit., p. 119. 
66 Jean Elisabeth Pedersen, 'Regulating Abortion and Birth Control: Gender, Medicine, and Republican 
Politics in France, 1970-1920,' French Historical Studies 19: 3 (1996), p. 684. 
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the legal grounds on which doctors could perform abortions, would have allowed for 
the compulsory notification of the names and addresses of women who underwent 
abortions had it become law, because "the general welfare of the state has to have 
precedence over women's feelings," as the preamble to the bill stated.67 Paragraph 
218 of the German Criminal Code, which punished abortion with a jail sentence even 
after it was amended in 1926, and Paragraph 184, section 3, which prohibited the 
advertising, publicising, or display of contraceptives as "objects intended for indecent 
use," decreed what opponents termed Gebiirzwang, the tyranny of involuntary 
childbirth. 68 The bill introduced in the French Chambre des deputes on 23 July 1920 
and passed just six days later 521 to 55, imposing strict penalties for the dissemination 
of any propaganda that encouraged abortion or contraception, was the most 
oppressive of its kind in Europe. 69 The United States continued to look to the 
Comstock Law in the 1920s to silence those who would advise young women and 
couples about how to control their own fertility.70 
These controls were not, however, purely demographic. By exempting 
condoms - one ofthe most wide-spread forms of contraception- from consideration, 
French and German legislators betrayed a deeper concern to preserve the double 
standard of morality, which sanctioned male promiscuity while maintaining the 
conditions that shackled women to their domestic, biologically-determined place in 
society. All 'female' forms of birth control were banned, but pro-natalist legislation 
did not address the most widely spread form of birth control, the practice of coitus 
interruptus. Adolphe Pinard, a French deputy and expert on natality, told the 
Chamber in 1920 that if the proposed law would bring the certitude of raising the 
French birthrate, he would "vote for it with both hands," but ''what you bring is only 
the shadow of a repression. In fact, what you bring is nothing."71 
67 Us borne, 'Pregnancy is the woman's active service,' pp. 392-3. The three bills were passed by the 
Upper House, the Bundesrat, and two of them- the first decreeing three years in prison for anyone 
knowingly transmitting venereal disease (ie. registered prostitutes, as men could not be forcibly 
examined), and the second banning all manufacturing, importing, sales and advertising of 
contraceptives, bar condoms -by the Reichstag Committee on Population Questions. Also see 
Usborne, The Politics of the Body, pp. 21-3. 
68 Grossmann, 'Abortion and Economic Crisis', p. 68. 
69 Roberts, op.cit., p. 94. 
70 The group of statutes known as the Comstock Law, passed in 1873, forebade the mailing, 
transportation, and importation of contraceptive information in America. See Kennedy, op.cit., pp. 23-
4 and ch. 8, 'Birth Control and the Law,' pp. 219-71. 
71 Roberts, op.cit., p. 95-6; Usborne, 'Pregnancy is the woman's active service,' p. 407. 
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Pinard's was one of a number of voices protesting the failure of states to 
prioritise more positive- rather than coercive- measures to raise natality.72 As 
Roberts and Usbome have implied, the 'fertility crisis' and its natalist rhetoric are 
inextricable from a masculine ideology that perceived a threat to established gender 
roles, in the startling new attitudes of women to their own fertility. 73 The perception 
of a demographic crisis justified the control of the female reproductive body by the 
state, which did "not have the right to remain neutral" in the battle for supremacy 
between female egotism and female altruism. 74 
Pedersen notes that Foucault's treatment ofbio-power, characterised by "an 
explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation ofbodies 
[ofthe entire 'species body'] and the control of populations," here applies only to 
women, through whose bodies state control was exercised. 75 Men retained their 
reproductive autonomy.76 Moves to check depopulation were moves to bring 
women's sexuality under state control, to prevent the control of fertility from falling 
into the hands of individual women. 
The birth control movement was associated with socialism and specifically 
with Soviet Russia, where a law had been passed in 1920 which legalised state-funded 
abortions.77 However, the fears of authority regarding control of fertility by 
72Proposals to stimulate the birth rate through maternal inducements and improvements in welfare -
more wide-ranging social measures- were, in general, given second place to legal sanctions against 
birth control which were cheaper and seemed to promise quick remedy of the population problem. 
Pedersen contrasted the attitudes of two French groups in the depopulation debate: the 'patriarchal 
patriots' who stood by using fiscal incentive programs for fathers of legitimate children, and the 
'solidarists', who advocated social assistance programs for mothers, especially single mothers: 
Pedersen, op.cit., pp. 678-87. 
73 Roberts, op.cit., p. 96 and passim; Us borne, 'Pregnancy is the woman's active service,' pp. 407-8. 
74 Quoted from the French decree to establish medals for mothers (1920): Bell and Offen, op.cit., p. 
308. 
75 Women underwent enforced pregnancies or illegal, dangerous abortions because of inadequate 
access to contraception, and many hundreds of women went to prison each year for undergoing 
terminations. See Usborne, The Politics of the Body, p. 30, and Brookes ,op.cit., pp. 165-176. 
76 Foucault, op.cit., p. 139 on the 'species body'; Pedersen, op.cit., p. 697. Legislative control over 
women's bodies was not premised solely on national population needs: the control of venereal disease 
was also justification for state interference in the sexual lives of individual women: see chapter 2 
below. 
77 Report of the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference, p. 42. In fact, 
socialists were divided on the issue of birth control or were deeply ambiguous in their attitudes to the 
Neo-Malthusian movement. In 1913 the German SPD had publicly rejected birth control. Socialist 
leaders on the whole were opponents of birth control and tended to the view that the 'population 
question' diverted attention from the class struggle. See William Petersen, 'Marxism and the 
Population Question: Theory and Practice' and Jay M. Winter, 'Socialism, Social Democracy, and the 
Population Questions in Western Europe: 1870-1950', both in MichaelS. Teitelbaum and Jay M. 
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individuals were, as Stella Browne pointed out, at base fears about its "widening of 
the scope ofhuman freedom and choice, its self-determining significance for women." 
Women's control of their own fertility might have profound effects upon the 
foundation of the domestic ideology, the subordination of women on the basis of their 
biological function. Browne insisted: " ... make no mistake about this. Birth Control, 
the diffusion of the knowledge and possibility of Birth Control, means freedom for 
women, social and sexual freedom, and that is why it is so intensely feared and 
disliked in many influential quarters to-day."78 
The strong opposition aroused by the flapper was tied up with awareness of 
increasing sexual and procreative choices for women, which states - try as they might 
-could not contain. The separation of sex from procreation interfered with the 
traditional notion of women as passive and submissive, by implying that women 
could enjoy intercourse without fear of the biological consequences: a possibility 
which, in legislative terms, was 'obscene' .79 Birth control would end the slavery of 
women in childbirth revealed in letters to Margaret Sanger in Motherhood in Bondage 
(1928). This threatened the double standard that separated the wife from the whore. 80 
Female access to les funestes secrets ("deadly secrets") was dangerous when 
Winter (eds.), Population and Resources in Western Intellectual Traditions, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989, pp. 77-101and 122-146. 
78Browne, op.cit., p. 40: Browne went on to explain that birth control was perceived as a threat because 
it would destabilise the established form of patriarchal marriage: "when marriage no longer means the 
subjection of unlimited motherhood and economic dependence of mothers, the main social reasons for 
its retention as a stereotyped formula will be at an end": pp. 40-1. 
79 James Woycke, Birth Control in Germany 1871-1933, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 50. Legislation 
of the period designed to remove the capacity to control fertility in marriage, including the US 
Comstock Law, referred to 'objects intended for obscene use' or similar. 
800ne German opponent of "this decrepid Malthusian egoism" said that "All Christian husbands should 
know that these practices lead not to stronger marital bonds but to the morality of the brothel." The 
moral impact of birth control would be to make wives "the slaves oflust," declared another (ibid., pp. 
52 and 134). Birth control was referred to as "conjugal fraud" or "Malthusian fraud": see Octavius 
Charles Beale, Racial Decay: A Compilation of Evidence from World Sources, Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1910, p. 274 and passim. The boundary between the 'sterile' eroticised prostitute as 'other' 
to the fertile mother/wife was of course merely a construction. As Marsha Meskimmon points out, 
many women were both prostitutes and mothers. Gerta Oberbeck's painting Prostitute (1923) 
challenged this boundary by representing the prostitute as an ordinary woman purchasing a douche. 
The fertility of the prostitute was not addressed in the work of male artists, who tended to depict the 
mother in contrast to the prostitute, in line with the 'wives for procreation, prostitutes for pleasure' 
paradigm (see Marsha Meskimmon, We Weren't Modern Enough: Women Artists and the Limits of 
German Modernism, London: I. B. Tauris, 1999, pp. 29-32). Nineteenth-century 'scientific' literature 
had revived the notion of the sexual woman as dangerous, and as a specific enemy of capitalism, in line 
with nineteenth-century ideas about the dangers of masculine sexual spending. Foucault described this 
tendency: the notion that the 'blood' - the strength, the wealth - of the bourgeois, was its 'sex' or 
semen, and that it had to be guarded and used only for procreative purposes. See B. Dijkstra, Evil 
Sisters: The Threat of Female Sexuality and the Cult of Manhood, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996, 
pp. 54-63, and Nye, op.cit., pp. 60-2. 
accompanied by a new insistence on their right to sexual pleasure.81 One man 
exclaimed against Marie Stopes, "What have you done? You have let women know 
about things which only prostitutes ought to know; once you give women a taste for 
these things, they become vampires."82 
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The perceived threat of a collapse of boundaries between wives and whores 
made fertility control a moral issue. Birth control created the 'new woman': it allowed 
the flapper to choose a life not defined by fertility and family life. The raising of the 
birth rate was "above all a moral question" as the French decree establishing medals 
for mothers asserted: 83 the 'moral question' being the question of how to convince 
young women to place the needs of others - the nation, the man, the child- before her 
own. 
Despite the opposing voices emanating from such quarters as the birth control 
movement, the effect of the war had been to strengthen the basis for the observation 
that women's relations are not based on individual feeling but on universals, 
generalities: that the 'mother' is a universal, and to become one is to renounce 
individualism and its hallmarks: rights, autonomy, selfhood.84 Nelly Roussel had 
suggested this in 1904: "Rights? What would you do with them, oh woman? Have 
you any need of rights? Accomplish without a murmur the sole task that suits you; 
the task that is your sole reason for existing. Make citizens and soldiers for us; give 
birth, give birth without pause; destroy your grace and wear away your health by 
continual gestation ... Expect no recompense. You are made to give and not to 
receive ... " She went on to warn that, "The day will come ... when we will become 
mothers only when we please ... "85 She was right. However, the woman of the 1920s 
who chose a life outside motherhood, eschewing her social duty, faced formidable 
81 Michelle Perrot, 'The New Eve and the Old Adam: Changes in French Women's Condition at the 
Tum of the Century' in M. R. Higonnet, J. Jenson, S. Michel and M. Collins Weitz (eds.), Behind the 
Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, p. 54. 
82 Quoted in Dijkstra, op.cit., p. 4. 
83 Bell and Offen, op.cit., p. 308. John R. Gillis detected an interesting epistemological shift occUlTing 
in the nineteenth century, which saw mothering, a shared task, become motherhood: an identity which 
came to define adult femininity, at the same time that fertility among the upper and middle classes 
began to decline. See 'Gender and Fertility Decline among the British Middle Classes' in Gillis et.al, 
pp. 31-47. The nineteenth century had seen great emotional emphasis placed on the family and the 
child as its centre. Children took on greater emotional value as their economic usefulness decreased, 
and childhood itself was given more prominence as an important stage of life as parental concerns 
turned from the need to be prolific, to the quality of the upbringing of few children. See Philippe 
Aries, Centuries of Childhood, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979. 
84 See, for example, Simone de Beauvoir's analysis ofHegel's view of this: The Second Sex, translated 
by H. M. Parshley, New York: Vintage Books, 1989, p. 435. 
85 Quoted in Bell and Offen, op.cit., pp. 135-6. 
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opposition. The effect of the war and its pressures, combined with public awareness 
of the decline in fertility, had been to strengthen a pronatalist ideology that attempted 
to efface female individuals in order to create mothers. 
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Chapter 2 
The 'larger life': the woman in the city. 
"Women to-day are not something apart from the national life, a sort of annex to the 
race, kept entirely for domestic service and reproduction; they are becoming people, 
half the nation, and growing to be considered and respected as such." (Lydia 
Commander Kingsmill, 1907) 1 
In a 1892 work Jules Simon, the French republican politician, had addressed 
the issue of citizenship: "What is a man's vocation? It is to be a good citizen. And 
woman's? To be a good wife and a good mother. One is in some way called to the 
outside world: the other is retained for the interior."2 The city was not a place for 
women. Political activity has been understood to be located in the public sphere, 
which encompasses the 'masculine' categories of citizen, national, rational actor, 
knowing subject, heterosexual and Westem.3 One ofNatalie Barney's most famous 
witticisms was that nothing in London was made for women, not even the men.4 The 
question ofhow women can be modem subjects, when they are associated with the 
private sphere and not the public, continues to preoccupy gender studies.5 Doctrines 
of individualism, of citizenship, did not necessarily apply to women, whose habitation 
of public space was questionable, and whose position in the city was precarious, even 
leaving aside the question of a maternal obligation that was to override individual 
aspirations. 
1 Commander, op.cit., p. 146, my emphasis. 
2 Quoted in McMillan, op.cit., p. 12. 
3 See for example Breda Gray, 'Review: Women, States and Nationalism. At home in the Nation?', 
Gender, Place and Culture 8:4 (2001), pp. 411-13. 
4 Quoted in Jane Marcus, 'A Wilderness of One's Own: Feminist Fantasy Novels of the Twenties: 
Rebecca West and Sylvia Townsend Warner' in Susan Merrill Squier (ed.), Women Writers and the 
City: Essays in Feminist Literary Criticism, Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1984, p. 
139. Natalie Barney, the famous salonniere in the Parisian expatriate community of the 1920s and 30s, 
was one of many creative women weaving a 'larger life' in the Paris urban scene. See Shari Benstock, 
'Paris Lesbianism and the Politics of Reaction, 1900-1940' in Martin Duberrnan, Martha Vicinus and 
George Chauncey, Jr., Hidden From History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past, Meridian: New 
York, 1989, pp. 332-346. 
5 See, for example, Suzam1e Mackenzie, 'Women in the City' in Richard Peet and Nigel Thrift ( eds.), 
New Models in Geography: the political-economy perspective, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp. 109-
126, and Jo Little, Linda Peake and Pat Richardson ( eds.), Women in Cities: Gender and the Urban 
Environment, London: Macmillan, 1988. 
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The new city of the twentieth century was an ever-expanding site of 
potentiality that offered opportunities -· spaces - for its inhabitants to live a 
multiplicity of lives. Urbanisation was linked to a vast dissolution of the moral 
authority associated with the family and the small community. Those cities that had 
grown to the status of 'world-city' -like the great metropolises Paris, Berlin, London 
and New York- were playgrounds of pleasure for the 'international' rich but also for 
the groups ofthe 'underground': lesbian and gay subcultures, artistic communities 
like Montparnasse in Paris, and the demi-monde. 
Sociologists and other commentators on cities attributed many social problems 
to the 'individualisation' of behaviour. William I. Thomas noted in 1923 that while in 
small communitites people became "more or less habituated to and reconciled with a 
life of repressed wishes," the fortunes of the individual being bound up with those of 
the family and community, the conditions of city life fostered in individuals a 
"personal schematization of life,- making one's own definitions of the situation and 
determining one's own behavior norms."6 As McGovern noted, the traditional 
"straight and narrow" could not serve the choices and opportunities of city life.7 
The doctrine of separate spheres, while manifest in culture from ancient times, 
was propagated and diffused on a huge scale in the nineteenth century, Hobsbawm's 
'era of the triumphant bourgeoisie. ' 8 The spatial separation of the sexes it dictated 
served to uphold a sexual double standard that cast women as housewives or whores, 
'courtisane ou menagere', prostitute or hausfrau. La femme au foyer- the woman by 
the hearth - supported a moral world required by the sexual division of labour under 
industrial capitalism, by which men ruled the world of public affairs, business and 
commerce. A woman theoretically had no place in the public realm, but was 
compensated with domestic power within a 'private' sphere that was hers by virtue of 
her hegemony in the realm of reproduction and child-rearing, a 'natural' role of which 
her exclusion from the public world was a 'natural' extension. 9 
6 William I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl: with cases and standpoint for behavior analysis, Montclair, 
New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1969 (1923), p. 71 and 86. 
7 James R. Me Govern, 'The American Woman's Pre-World War I Freedom in Manners and Morals,' 
The Journal of American History 55 (1968-69), p. 319. 
8 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age ofCapita/1848-1875, London: Abacus, 1975, p. 15. 
9 See McMillan op.cit. on the cult of domesticity in France, esp. chapter 1. The bourgeois 'double 
standard' of morality prescribed fidelity for wives and chastity for daughters but allowed men to have 
pre-and extra-marital sexual relations with women not of their class. Friedrich Engels reflected: "What 
for the woman is a crime entailing grave legal and social consequences is considered honourable in a 
man or, at the worst, a slight moral blemish which he cheerfully bears." On the subject of separate 
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Indeed, if demographers, politicians and scientists continued to espouse a 
world view grounded in Kathleen Biddick's definition of Derelection: an "inability to 
write about the feminine as other than an imagined unity of the maternal function and 
the mother-daughter relation," so city planners in the age of the Metropolis continued 
to allocate space according to biological function, perpetuating the continuance of the 
'Two Spheres' by creating suburban spaces for women where they were disconnected 
from the workplace and the rest of the city, and restricting their mobility by failing to 
provide adequate transport. 10 As Elizabeth Wilson notes, the city after the industrial 
revolution continued to be conceived within ancient binary contrasts: male/ female, 
culture/ nature, city/ country. 11 The urban woman she describes is a 'sphinx in the 
city,' a symptom of disorder in a society where men rule the outside, and women the 
inside. Aaron Betsky conceives this as a matter of womb versus penis: a construction 
that links space and biological function. Men project, women protect. Men construct 
'inhuman' spaces and women make them liveable, rebuilding the protection ofthe 
womb in interior spaces. 12 
Patrick Geddes, a Scot prominent in the modem town planning movement that 
sprang up in the 1890s, also called himself a sociologist. He dedicated his career to 
stressing the biological imperative for retaining the concept of the Two Spheres. In 
evolutionary terms biological role determined social role, and therefore the social role 
spheres, Engels noted that even with the opening of employment in industry to women, the wife's 
domestic duties in the "private service of her family" precluded her taking part in "public production": 
such that the "modem individual family is founded on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the 
wife, and modem society is a mass composed of these individual families as its molecules" (The 
Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, New York: International Publishers, 1972 
(1884), pp. 138 and 137). According to Nye, the public and private spheres of the bourgois social 
structure were so sharply delineated that "only two wholly different beings could occupy them," 
necesitating the construction of a biomedical model of male and female by medical scientists and 
thinkers-like Jean-Jacques Rousseau in France, that made the sexes 'naturally' suited to their respective 
roles and duties. The ideological construct of 'separate spheres' required a lot of defending on the 
shaky ground of 'nature': Nye, op.cit.,ch. 4. 
1° Kathleen Biddick, 'Genders, Bodies, Borders: Technologies of the Visible,' Speculum 68 (1993), p. 
416; Helen Meller, 'Planning theory and women's role in the city', Urban History Yearbook 17 (1990), 
pp. 85-6. 
11 Wilson, The Sphinx in the City, p. 8. 
12 Aaron Betsky, Building Sex: Men, Women, Architecture and the Construction of Sexuality, New 
York: William Morrow and Company, 1995, pp. xii-xv. Architects and theorists including Betsky 
were influenced by Foucault's notion of 'heterotopia' or 'other spaces.' Spaces designated for the 
'other' in society included the prison, the brothel, the asylum and the colony. Betsky and others 
extended the defmition to apply to women and to include the street and other urban spaces. See Mary 
McLeod, "'Other" Spaces and "Others"' in Diana Agrest, Patricia Conway and Leslie Kanes Weisman, 
The Sex of Architecture, New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1996, pp. 15-28. 
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of women was to nurture, in the interior, protective space of the home. 13 But while 
the twentieth century city and its planners reinforced the gendering of space, women 
were on the move. By 1907 Commander could say that "all classes of American 
women are less in their homes ... and in every way have larger, freer lives than 
formerly." 14 Middle-class women were observed to claim an enlarged sphere of 
action even before the war. 15 The increased presence of middle-class women in 
public places -places of men, of power- for commerce, and for pleasure, attested to 
a rebellion against their traditional exclusion from urban space. When the young 
Alabama in Zelda Fitzgerald's Save Me the Waltz tells her mother she wants to go to 
New York, she asks, "What on earth for?" -to which the teen replies, "To be my own 
boss."16 The woman in the city, though a 'sphinx,' was offered the possibility of 
living a life outside the patriarchal definition of woman-as-mother, a definitionupheld 
by a structure that rested on the separation of the private domestic space and the 
public civic space, the gendered "twin anchors of the middle-class state."17 
Urban growth had been rapid from 1800: by 1910 the percentage ofEuropeans 
who could be considered townsfolk had tripled, and in America the percentage had 
increased sevenfold. 18 Great Britain had led the process of urbanisation, with a shift 
from rural areas that saw over half the population classifiable as urban by 1851. The 
United States census of 1920 showed for the first time that most Americans lived in 
cities and towns. With 5, 620, 000 inhabitants, New York was a 'world city' .19 A 
cultural 'urban tilt' became increasingly obvious in the West. 
13 Meller, op.cit., pp. 87-8. Feminist planners and architects have criticised the fact that the built 
environment of the city reinforces stereotypes of men's work as 'productive' and women's work as 
'reproductive,' delineating their respective 'proper' places and their relative significance. See Matrix, 
Making Space: Women and the Man-Made Environment, London: Pluto Press, 1985, and Delores 
Hayden, The Grand Domestic Revolution: A History of Feminist Designs for American Homes, 
Neighbourhoods and Cities, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1981. 
14 Commander, op.cit., p. 166. 
15 M G 't . c ovem, op.cz ., passzm. 
16 Zelda Fitzgerald, Save Me the Waltz, London: Jonathan Cape, 1968, p. 16. 
17 Betsky, op.cit., p. 149. 
18 Andrew Lees, Cities Perceived: Urban Society in European and American Thought, 1820-1940, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985, p. 1. In the period 1800-1910 London's population 
rose from 1.1 million to 7.3 million; Paris' from 547, 000 to 2.9 million; Berlin's from 172, 000 to over 
2 million, and New York's from 60,000 to 4.8 million. 
19 Teitelbaum, The British Fertility Decline, p. 3. 
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The growth of public awareness of the decline in fertility coincided in the 
twenties with interest in the city and urban life as a phenomenon.20 During the decade 
before the Great War there had been an awakening of interest in town planning and 
the possibility of urban improvement.21 Urban life was a chief concern of the 
pioneering 'Chicago School' of sociologists, including Louis Wirth, who 
characterised urban relationships as "impersonal, superficial, transitory, and 
segmental." Cities were understood to breed loneliness and individualism.22 
A general anti-urbanism was an important cultural influence in the 1920s. 
Charles-Edouard Jeanneret, better known as Le Corbusier, spoke of the "sickness of 
great cities" and "the cancer of Paris" throughout the twenties, while upholders of 
rural virtue in the great confrontation between urban and rural values in America 
castigated the city for breeding religious scepticism and intellectual arrogance.23 In 
1928 Karl von Mangoldt wrote that the development ofbig cities threatened "the 
roots of our whole existence."24 
20 There had been a surge in inquiry into urban living from the 1880s, beginning in Britain where 
urbanisation was the most marked. This interest continued well into the inter-war years, with the 
leading role of British thought on the subject giving way to the massive outpourings of virulent anti-
urbanism from German commentators and urban sociologists in America: Lees, op.cit., pp. 11-12. 
21 Philip Mairet, Pioneer of Sociology: The Life and Letters of Patrick Geddes, London: Lund 
Humphries, 1957, p. 139. Also see Lyle W. Dorsett (ed.), The Challenge of the City 1860-1910, 
Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1968. 
22 Louis Wirth, 'Urbanism as a Way of Life' (1938) in Richard Sennett (ed.), Classic Essays on the 
Culture of Cities, New York: Meredith Corporation, 1969, p. 153. Wirth drew together strands of 
thought on the city associated with figures like Emile Durkheim, George Simmel and Max Weber in 
this essay, as well as the more recent contributions of urban sociologists like Robert Park, who was 
credited with founding the Chicago School. See Brian J. L. Berry, The Human Consequences of 
Urbanisation, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973, pp. 9-15, on sociological urban theory. The 
Chicago school viewed city life as being disastrous for the family due to the movement towards 
individualisation which was concentrated there. See Ernest R. Mowrer, Family Disorganisation, New 
York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1972 (1927), and Charles Richmond Hendersen, 'Are 
Modern Industry and City Life Unfavourable to the Family?', The American Journal of Sociology Vol. 
14 (July 1908-May 1909), pp. 668-80, for an earlier example. Whereas biblical and early Christian 
writers had used the city as a symbol of man's estrangement from God, sociology saw it as 
representing man's estrangement from his neighbour and communal bonds: see Lees, op.cit., p. 6. 
23 Mowry and Brownell, op.cit., pp. 3-4; Lees, op,cit., p. 268; William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of 
Prosperity 1914-1932, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, pp. 7-8. Lewis Mumford, the 
influential disciple of Patrick Geddes, was pessimistic about the American city: "Our metropolitan 
civilisation is not a success .. .it is still a wilderness" ('The City' in Stearns, op.cit., pp. 19-20). 
24 It did so in four ways: biologically, in terms of the low birth rate of cities; politically through the 
"negation of the bases of a healthy democracy"; militarily because of the vulnerability of big cities to 
attack; and morally - because of the obstacles the city put in the way of moral regeneration (quoted in 
Lees, op.cit., p. 275). Anti-urbanism was especially marked in Germany, and intensified in the 1930s 
under the influence of National Socialism; urban-rural conflict was a great theme of the 1920s in 
American culture, as evidenced in the novels of Sinclair Lewis and others. On Alfred E. Smith's loss 
of the 1928 US federal election, Stanley Walker wrote, "Of all the many counts against Smith, one was 
that he was a New Yorker. As such, he was taken as the high and menacing symbol of evil and his 
name held up before the country as the man who represented all that was abhorrent about the great city 
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Demographers and other commentators were obsessed with the relationship 
between urbanisation and the declining birth rate. A strong heritage of a 
"biologically-based anti-urbanism," originally emanating from Britain, held that 
degenerate city dwellers would die out -perhaps in three generations - without the 
'new blood' provided by rural migration.25 City life was believed to be unhealthy. 
The popular conviction that urban women were susceptible to sickliness and nervous 
complaints remained strong well into the inter-war years?6 
Women needed a rural environment for their 'natural' conservatism and 
morality to flourish. The city offered only materialistic values and sensual 
temptations.27 Jane Addams, the extremely influential social worker and 
commentator, expressed concern that the city was a poor environment for the young 
girls flooding there, as "the modem city sees in these girls only two possibilities, both 
ofthem commercial": the utilisation of their labour power, and the extraction oftheir 
wages from them in "pandering to their love ofpleasure."28 Walter Lippman 
complained that "those who make no pretensions to much theory are twisted about by 
-from pronunciation to liquor-drinking": The Night Club Era, Baltimore: The John Hopkins 
University Press, 1999 (1933), p. 65. 
25 Lees, op.cit., pp. 147 and 136-9; J. Milner Fothergill, The Town Dweller: His Needs and Wants 
(1889) in Lynn Hollen Lees and Andrew Lees (eds.), The Rise of Urban Britain, New York: Garland 
Publishing, 1985. 
26 Arthur Bordier, a French doctor, labelled urban sickliness 'malaria urbana' in 1887 and attributed the 
low birth rate of cities to fatigue from work and 'worldly pleasures,' lack of exercise and 'too much 
celebral centralisation of organic energies' among other things: Lees, op.cit., p. 141. Previously, James 
Cantlie had attributed the poor health of Londoners to bad air and poor nutrition, which bred 'city 
disease': Degeneration Amongst Londoners ( 1885), in Lees and Lees, The Rise of Urban Britain, 
op.cit., passim. It was well known that much fewer urban men were fit for military service than their 
rural counterparts: Lees, op.cit., pp. 139 and 148. The idea that city living destroyed the urban 
woman's nerves was in great vogue: Fothergill asserted that "the highly strung neurosal woman is, as a 
rule, a town product" and advised that "these blighted women are very poor material for wife and 
mother" (op.cit., p. 96). In 1890 J. P. Williams-Freeman had written that urban mothers produced only 
poor milk, or none at all: quoted in Lees, op.cit., p. 138. 
27If city women were bad breeders, they were also morally inferior to their rural sisters: the town girl 
avoided the disciplining influence of domestic service, being "apt to prefer the squalor of umestrained 
freedom and the chaff and excitement of the streets and alleys" (Fothergill, op.cit., p. 76). Lees noted 
that a typical article in the German periodical Das Land emphasised the dangers and temptations of city 
life for women, stressing that urban life destroyed the foundations of the feminine character: op. cit., p. 
161. In the United States it was a common notion that urban living could easily overwhelm the 
virtuous, particularly innocent girls from rural areas and immigrant women, and lure them into 
prostitution. The 'white slave' trade became a focus of a general indictment of urban life. See Egal 
Feldman, 'Prostitution, the Alien Woman and the Progressive Imagination, 1910-1915,' American 
Quarterly 19 (1967), pp. 194-206. 
28 Jane Addams, The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets, New York: Macmillan, 1957 (1909), p. 8. 
fashions, 'crazes,' at the mercy of milliners and dressmakers, theatrical producers, 
advertising campaigns and the pre-meditated gossip of the newspapers. "29 
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Authority was nervous about the city.30 In 1891 Emile Levasseur had written, 
"In the great agglomerations, passions ferment more ... storms of [the revolutionary] 
kind almost always break out in the capitals."31 Berlin had seen bloody street fights in 
the revolution of 1918-19, and there had been popular disturbances in London during 
the Boer War period, leading to fears being expressed as to the explosive climate of 
that city. Memories ofthe Commune inevitably loomed large in the case ofParis, 
where the capital had been "the setting ifnot the cause" of the most memorable 
revolutionary outbreaks in recent European history.32 There was also an awareness of 
the threat of the city in American thought: in 1891 Josiah Strong had warned: "When 
our urban population has been multiplied several fold ... THEN will come the real test 
of our institutions, then will appear whether we are capable of self-govemment."33 
The Mayor ofNew York, James J. Walker, felt it was dangerous for the poor working 
man, on his way to work at dawn, to see groups of well-dressed tipsy people emerging 
from night clubs: "That way lay Bolshevism."34 
Neo-Malthusian tendencies, in the intensely pronatalist climate of the 1920s, 
were viewed as another form of urban subversiveness. 35 In France, where the 1920 
law effectively silenced the neo-Malthusian movement, proponents ofbirth control 
like Paul Robin and Madeleine Pelletier had been vilified by the nationalist press and 
regarded with suspicion by the state, being made objects of police surveillance.36 In 
1921 Margaret Sanger was arrested by the New York police as she rose to speak on 
29 Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery: An Attempt to Diagnose the Current Unrest, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961 (1914), p. 93. 
30 Lees, op.cit., pp. 166-9. 
31 Ibid., p. 170. In 1889 the conservative journal Die Grenzboten had predicted that the increasing 
predominance of the big city would lead ultimately to the rule of the proletariat, and Wilhehn Boree 
had declared that "The conflict between city and state is as old as Germany itself: ibid., p. 172. 
32 Ibid., p. 173, 169 and 170; on revolution in the streets of Berlin see Torsten Pahner and Hendrik 
Neubauer, The Weimar Republic Through the Lens of the Press, Cologne: Konemann, 2000, pp. 44-62. 
33Lees, op.cit., p. 174. 
34 Walker, op.cit., pp. 88-9. 
35 On the history of contraception and the birth control movement see Clive Wood and Beryl Suitters, 
The Fight for Acceptance: A History of Contraception, Aylesbury: Medical and Technical Publishing 
Company, 1970. In 1910 Hans Rost lashed out against the big cities which "like Kronos, devour their 
children ... [and are the] graves of the human race": quoted in Lees, op.cit., p. 148. 
36 It was feared that they were selling contraceptives to fund revolution. See McMillan, op.cit., p. 36 
and Cole, op.cit., p. 662. 
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'Birth Control: Is It Moral?' at the first American Birth Control Conference.37 In 
England, where the birth control movement had attained greater respectability, it did 
so only by appealing to its devotion to moral causes like early marriage and the 
prevention of promiscuity, prostitution, abortion and venereal disease. 38 
An urban-based resistance was in evidence in the notion of the 'birth strike,' 
the famous German proposal having been put by two Social Democratic Party 
members from Berlin. 39 The urban woman and her supporters, with their developed 
intellectual faculties and other 'modern' personality traits, were distressingly inclined 
to question for what the state might require children, and- more importantly- to ask 
for what reason the modern woman might require children, given the value she placed 
on her freedom, her mobility, and her individualism. 
At the same time that the propaganda of depopulation reached a fever pitch, 
the young urban woman was thrust to the fore of national consciousness. The 
'flapper' was hijacked by the media and seemingly exulted. F. Scott Fitzgerald made 
his fortune from tapping this interest, in a world apparently obsessed with the 
wayward urban woman. Dorothy Parker wrote of the flapper, 
All spotlights focus on her pranks 
37 Dorothy M. Brown, Setting a Course: American Women in the 1920s, Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1987, pp. 113-14. 
38 Report of the Fifth International Neo-Malthusian and Birth Control Conference, 104-8. Also see 
Angus McLaren, 'The Sexual Politics of Reproduction in Britain' in Gillis, et.al., op.cit., pp. 85-100. 
Maries Stopes, the woman credited with the popularisation of birth control in England, among other 
policies to render her message respectable made sharp tactical distinctions between birth control and 
abortion: see Ruth Hall, Marie Stapes: A Biography, London: Andre Deutsch, 1977. The British 
movement for birth control had been lent m1expected respectability after Lord Dawson, the King's 
physician, attacked restrictive attitudes towards sexuality at the 1921 Church Congress: "To tell you the 
truth, I am not too sure that too much prudent self restraint suits love and its purport. Romance and 
deliberate self control do not, to my mind, rhyme very well together. A touch of madness to begin with 
does no harm. Heaven knows, life sobers it soon enough. If you don't start life with a head of steam 
you won't get far." He went on to call for Church support for birth control, in a speech that did much 
to break down resistance to the movement: see Colin Francome, Abortion Freedon: A Worldwide 
Movement, London: George, Allen, and Unwin, 1984, pp. 55-6. 
39 The two doctors, Alfred Bernstein and Julius Moses, were propagandists for birth control among the 
working classes as a weapon of revolution. In 1912 they called for a national birth strike, arguing that 
if women refused to supply the ruling class with cannon fodder and cheap labour, capitalism would 
collapse. However, the SPD leadership condemned the motion as anti-socialist, as it implied that the 
working classes were responsible for their own misery. The task fell to Clara Zetkin, Luise Ziete and 
Rosa Luxemburg to defend the SPD official line: Zetkin famously proclaimed that boycotting the birth 
of 'soldiers for the state' would also mean 'no soldiers for the revolution.' See Usborne, The Politics 
of the Body, pp. 8-9. In France in 1919 Nelly Roussel encouraged women to a greve des ventres or 
'womb strike' to protest the conditions of poverty in which women were being pushed to bear children. 
See Roberts, op.cit., p. 123. 
All tongues her prowess herald 
For which she well may render thanks 
To God and Scott Fitzgerald.40 
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These women were defined by their urban outlook. In contrast to Rousseau's 
Julie -the 'new Heloise,' who found spiritual fulfilment in the rural setting and 
motherhood, fleeing the city as the spatial anathema to the virtuous maternal ideal of 
womanhood- the flapper yearned for the city. A motif of the young girl's arrival in 
the great city characterised the twenties, following Owen Johnson's novel The 
Salamander (1914), in which the heroine, the prototype-flapper Dore Baxter, has "got 
to have New York."41 Zelda Fitzgerald and her friend Sara Haardt both married 
literary figures as a ticket to New York out of the rural South. 42 Alexandra Kollontai 
could list a number of 'women of the new type' in literature who sought a new life in 
the big city, like Karl Hauptmann's Mathilde.43 Victor Margueritte's La Gart;:onne 
(1922) depicts a modem woman who renounces her bourgeois family to live an 
independent life in Paris.44 
The visibility of women on the streets was construed as a threat to existing 
hierarchies of male cultural authority. A fascination with the new presence was 
everywhere apparent, the "intermixing of gender-specific assignment of space"45 
seeming to define the male experience of modernity. The city of modernity was 
depicted as a woman. This is a commonplace ofWestem literature generally: the city 
is to be "conquered, raped and subjugated, or idealized in a quest, captured in a war, 
wooed like a lover, spumed like a wife."46 Literary men in the 1920s intensified this 
40 Dorothy Parker, 'The Flapper' quoted in 'Flapper Culture and Style' at 
http://www.geocities.com/flapper culture/. 
41 . . . ··-· Quoted mTaylor, op.czt., p. 6. 
42 Ibid., p. 50 (Sara Haardt married H. L. Mencken). 
43 Alexandra Kollontai, 'The New Woman' (1920) in The Autobiography of a Sexually Emancipated 
Woman, translated by Salvador Attanasio, London: Orbach and Chambers, 1972 (1926), p. 55. 
44 See Roberts, op.cit., pp. 46-61. 
45 Katharina Von Ankum, 'Gendered urban spaces in Irmgard Keun's Das kunstseidene Madchen' in 
Katharina von Ankum ( ed.), Women in the Metropolis: Gender and Modernity in Weimar Culture, 
California: University of California Press, 1997 p. 164. 
46 Marcus, op.cit., p 140. Male writers have more traditionally associated the female body with earth 
and nature. The tendency to project 'woman' onto a desired or feared space is part of a generalised 
theme of woman as 'other' or 'object' to the male 'self' or 'subject' in the Western canon. This pattern 
is illustrated in the institution offlanerie, associated with Charles Baudelaire and other observers of the 
modern city. The flaneur wanders the streets, observing, and is himself unobserved. The woman, being 
the 'natural' object of observation, is excluded from this anonymous spectatorship according to film 
theory: see Anke Geleber, 'Female Flanerie and the Symphony of the City' in von Ankum, op.cit., pp. 
67-88. 
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tendency, conflating the city with the visibility of women within it, from Carl 
Zuckrnayer on Berlin to Henry Miller on New York in Black Spring: "Tall, stately, 
full-bodied, self-possessed, she cuts the smoke and jazz and red-light glow like the 
queen mother of all the slippery Babylonian whores ... This is Broadway, this is New 
York, this is Arnerica."47 
The anxiety surrounding fertility carne to focus inevitably on the city, an urban 
'cesspool' which had spawned the revolution in manners and morals. Urban 
sociologists and other commentators continually connected the "urban evil" with 
rising divorce, the prevalence of venereal diseases, and other social problerns.48 
Fecundity was seen to be particularly affected by urban lifestyles. Floods of women 
of child-bearing age were more visible in the city, more conspicuously outside the 
space reserved for them on a biological basis - the home, the private sphere - , than 
ever before. They were in the streets, going to work, shopping, going about their 
business: many of them, with the new economic roles available to women, had 
business. They were not secreted inside the private spaces, the interstices, of the city 
but were in the streets, where traditionally only disreputable women had been (figures 
8-9). 
Fig. 8: Prostitutes on Jj'riedricb.strasse,. 
Berlin 1930 
47 Carl Zuckmayer wrote in A Part of Myself that "people discussed Berlin ... as if Berlin were a highly 
desirable woman, whose coldness and capriciousness were well known ... Some saw her as hefty, full-
breasted, in lace underwear, others as a mere wisp of a thing, with boyish legs in black silk 
stockings ... All wanted to have her ... To conquer Berlin was to conquer the world." Quoted in Patrice 
Petro, Joyless Streets: Women and Melodramatic Representation in Weimar Germany, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1989, p. 42. Also see Dorothy Rowe, 'Desiring Berlin: Gender and 
Modernity in Weimar Germany' in Marsha Meskimmon and Shearer West (eds.), Visions of the 'Neue 
Frau': Women and the Visual Arts in Weimar Germany, Aldershot, Rants: Scolar Press, 1995, pp. 143-
164. Miller quoted in P. Jukes, A Shout in the Sreet: The Modern City, London: Faber and Faber, 1990, 
p. 103. 
48 Hendersen, op.cit., pp. 671-73. 
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Census figures continually revealed a lower birthrate within the bounds of the 
metropolis, and demographic theory gave a prominent place to rural-urban 
differentials. Berlin, with reportedly the lowest birth rate in the world by 1924, was a 
"wilderness of sterile promiscuity."49 By 1933 just over 35 percent of married 
couples in Berlin were childless, twice the national average, and by 1931 as many as 
one million women a year had abortions. 50 It was suggested by one contemporary 
source that abortions were more frequent than births in Berlin in 1929.51 
49Usborne, The Politics of the Body, p. 32; Mason, op.cit., p. 82. Urban fertility has almost always 
been lower than rural in the West: see William Petersen, Population, Second Edition, London: 
Macmillan, 1969, pp. 496-505. 
50 Grossmann, Reforming Sex, p. 4 and 'Abortion and Economic Crisis,' pp. 80-1. 
51 With a ratio of 103: 100. See A.M. Carr-Saunders, World Population: Past Growth and Present 
Trends, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, p. 98. 
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Lydia Kingsmill Commander had observed as early as 1907 New York's 
"numerous class of childless couples." Her visits to twenty-two apartment houses in 
some of the better neighbourhoods of the city, comprising 485 families, revealed only 
54 children. As had been observed in other countries, Commander found that urban 
housing discouraged large families. 52 The 1917 report of the National Birth Rate 
Commission in Great Britain devoted an entire chapter to the housing problem, 
including the issue of landlords who preferred tenants with no children. 53 Weimar 
urban architecture was "streamlined and determinedly functional" and "clearly 
designed for a smaller family."54 Cities presented opportunities for women to find 
new ways of being women, without children and large homes within which to create a 
haven for family. Small apartments meant more going out, creating a larger life: and 
the modem woman who had other plans for herself could say, 'Oh but we have no 
space for children!' 
Herbert Spencer and others had theorised that western society's inevitable 
rise to the height of civilisation would devastate natality: a thesis borne out more 
recently by scholars such as Fawcett, who found that people classified as 'more 
modem' were more likely to subscribe to values that were anti-natalist in 
implication. 55 The problem of civilisation was a problem oflarge cities. Early 
comment on the city had linked it unequivocally to the moral problem of"wicked 
individualism."56 The modem urbanite, educated, socially ambitious and exposed to 
mass media, did not have the fatalistic attitude to reproduction associated with the 
rural population. Gloria in Fitzgerald's The Beautiful and Damned made the 
distinction: "It isn't an indignity for them. It's their one excuse for living. It's the 
one thing they're good for. It is an indignity for me."57 The flapper, as the iconic 
modem woman, demanded the dignity of a life lived independently of the biological 
52Commander, op.cit., pp. 10-11. 
53 The Declining Birth Rate: Its Causes and Effects, pp. 46-56. 
54 Grossmann, Reforming Sex, pp. 7-8. 
55 J. T. Fawcett and M. H. Bomstein, 'Modernization, individual modernity and fertility', East-West 
Center reprint no. 36, from Fawcett, J. T. ( ed.), Psychological Perspectives on Population, Basic 
Books: New York, 1973, p. 111. Enid Charles distinguished between physiological sterility and 
psychological sterility: the latter denoting those "temperamental peculiarities" which made an 
individual likely to avail him or herself of the opportunities for control of fertility. See The Twilight of 
Parenthood: A Biological Study of the Decline of Population Growth, London: Watts and Co., 1934, p. 
179. 
56 Lees, op.cit., p. 161. 
57 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Beautiful and Damned, London: Penguin, 1988 (1922), p. 140. 
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'destiny' which had defined traditional womanhood, while men were defined by their 
public roles.58 The flapper saw herself as 'good' for something else. 
The 'civilisation' theory of depopulation gained wide acceptance, 
incorporating a Spenglerian bitterness about the development of modern civilisation, 
symbolised by the big city, into the debate on depopulation. The German school of 
urban studies theorised that city life bred a rational, impersonal, and autonomous 
character: Spengler saw civilisation throwing up sterility, arising from an isolated 
urban existence that frees the individual from the "plantlike urge of the blood to 
continue itself."59 The highly civilised urban woman no longer "approximated more 
nearly to the lower animals": she had "too many sides to her nature to contentedly 
merge her existence in the reproductive function." 60 'Modern' personality traits, with 
which women were increasingly aligned, particularly in the cities, sounded a note of 
doom for fertility. 
The trend towards smaller families, which was associated with France but by 
1907 was described as part of the "American Spirit,"61 was also bemoaned in Britain, 
and in Germany where in 1928 the Prussian minister for social welfare said that 
people "simply do not want more than one or two children."62 This tendency was 
associated with the rise of the urban world. Classic transition theory assumed city 
dwellers had more reason to limit their families or remain childless altogether. 63 In 
France, Arsene Dumont had attributed fertility decline to 'social capillarity': that is, to 
the 'selfish' ambition of individuals to advance in the socio-economic scale, an 
ascension impeded by responsibility for children, who are "rivals for their own 
58 Helen Callaway has noted that, "To be female is first to be identified with biological reproduction," 
while a man is likely to be designated as a father only incidentally to the list of public activities and 
achievements which proclaim his essential identity: "The Most Essentially Female Function of All': 
Giving Birth' in Shirley Ardener ( ed.), Defining Females: The Nature of Women in Society, New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1978, p. 164. 
59 Civilised man as an aggregate no longer clung to life: depopulation was not merely a matter of 
causality as science would have it, but a reflection of urban man's "metaphysical turn towards death" 
(Spengler, The Decline of the West, pp. 105, 103). For the German school of urban studies, see 
Sennett, Classic Essays on the Culture of Cities, ch. 2. 
6
° Commander, op.cit., pp. 176-7. 
61/bid., p. 21. 
62 Grossmann, Reforming Sex, p. 4. On the 'small-family system' see Carr-Saunders, World 
Population, pp. 106-111. 
63 The strong emphasis on economic modernisation in the theory of demographic transition stressed the 
influence of new urban life-styles. Certainly large cities led the trend of fertility decline, but the 
European Fertility Project found more recently that industrialisation and urbanisation explained 
relatively little ofthe pattern. See Coale and Watkins, op.cit. 
happiness."64 Dumont observed that social capillarity was fostered by political 
democracy, and that it flourished in brilliant centres of culture like Paris.65 
Histories concerned with gender and urban space have been preoccupied, 
especially since the late 1970s, with the prostitute and moral controls in the 
nineteenth-century western European urban scene, in the golden age of the jlfineur 
and Josephine Butler.66 The prostitute was conceived as being outside the moral 
structures of the middle class, a world built on the foundation ofthe Two Spheres. 
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She was a rebuke to the social order in her carving out of a feminine space for herself 
in the city, on the street. The prostitute was a 'loose woman' in every sense, as 
Betsky notes, being "loose from the bounds of a moralized space."67 She acted, for 
contemporary observers and for later historians, as the "quintessential female figure of 
the urban scene."68 
However, the idea of the 'public woman' as an aberration commands 
particular attention in the war and postwar period, due to the increased visibility of 
women of all classes in urban space. The era saw a breakdown of distinctions 
between working girl and working girl, as women carved out a space for themselves 
as participants in the economy: claiming a productive role in apparent contempt for 
their reproductive role. 
64Depopulation was one of the 'perils of prosperity' associated with t~e conditions of social 
competitiveness - ambition and bourgeois love of luxury and decadence -which were viewed as being 
products of modem democratic individualism. Egoism was the "ruin ofbourgeois society": Cole, 
op.cit., p. 667. The French Revolution with its emphasis on the rights of the individual, was posited by 
some to have bred these conditions, making man more circumspect and prone to limit fertility as it 
benefited him as an individual, as argued by C. Turgeon, who asserted in 1907 that demographic 
growth gave rise to foresight, egoism, self-interest, feminism, ambition and love of pleasure, which led 
in tum to decline, and by Jacques Bertillon in his La depopulation de la France (1911): See Joseph J. 
Spengler, France Faces Depopulation, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1938, pp. 167-
70. 
65 Ibid., pp. 156-8. Joseph Spengler noted that 'volitional' theories of fertility decline- those that 
blamed individual 'selfishness'- dominated the debate on depopulation (see pp. 135-6). 
66 See Graham Russell Hodges, 'Flaneurs, Prostitutes, and Historians: Sexual Commerce and 
representation in the nineteenth-century metropolis,' Journal of Urban History 23: 4 (May 1997), pp. 
488-497 and Anthony R. Henderson, 'Prostitution and the City,' Journal of Urban History 23: 2 (Jan 
1997), pp. 231-239, for reviews of recent publications on the subject. 
67 Betsky, op.cit., p. 149. 
68 Henderson, op.cit., p. 231. The focus of historians of gender and urban space on this period, the mid-
to-late nineteenth century, has been determined partly by the abundance of source material generated 
by government regulation of prostitution. 
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In her 1916 Women's War Work, Mrs Churchill expressed the idea that war 
brings the contribution ofwomen to light, making them more visible. 69 Historians 
have painted the war as a period of unprecedented economic opportunities for women, 
characterised by their 'new' visibility in the city. During and after the war, office and 
clerical work- concentrated in the cities, and in the public view - overtook domestic 
service as the main form of employment for young women. The relocation of 
women's economic roles gave the illusion that they were being given greater access to 
public power.70 
The war opened up to women areas of employment that had previously been 
closed to them. The conflict created an increased bureaucratisation of public life that 
saw a major growth of employment for women in the white-collar sector that would 
not be reversed with the Armistice. In 1906 women had constituted 5.5 percent ofthe 
service sector in France: by 1921 they represented 28 percent.71 In Germany by 1925 
there were almost one and a half million female white collar workers: three times as 
many as in 1907.72 Female clerks, typists, sales girls and minor administrators filling 
the cities became a recognised image of modernity: in popular culture the glamorous 
'Girl' of modernism was imagined to effortlessly combine work and a social life in 
the big city. However, women seeking freedom and independence in the city, the 
69 Quoted in Deborah Thorn, 'Women and work in wartime Britain' in Richard Wall and Jay Winter 
(eds.), The Upheaval of War: Family, Work and Welfare in Europe, 1914-1918, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 297. Popular memory of the war emphasised the images of 
women replacing men on the homefront by assuming traditionally male jobs: of seeing women 
operating machinery, or working as tram conductors or postal deliverers. 
70 More recently historians have emphasised the theme of continuity in women's employment: 
McGovern pointed out, in the case of America, that the great leap in women's work occurred between 
1900 and 1910. In 1890 American women comprised 21.7 percent of the employed, 23.5 percent in 
1900, 28.1 percent in 1910, 28.3 percent in 1920, and 29.7 percent in 1930: McGovern, op.cit., p. 320. 
Other scholars have similarly seen the increase in female employment in the war period as being less 
significant than popular memory would have it. Despite the prominence of a domestic ideology in 
French society, that country was known for its high rate of female participation in the labour force -
estimated at as high as 35 to 40 percent- before the war. Daniel Ute found that in Germany war 
service in mmaments factories was taken up by women who were already in employment, displaced 
especially from the service industry, and Bridenthal and Koonz argued that women's presence was felt 
more because it had not been accepted in the first place, and was hardly likely to be embraced in this 
period of inflation and depression: Daniel Ute, 'Woman's work in industry and family: Germany, 
1914-18,' in Wall and Wir).ter, The Upheaval of War, p. 278; Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, 
'Beyond Kinder, Kuche, Kirche: Weimar Women in Politics and Work' in Bridenthal, et.al., pp. 44-5. 
Deborah Thorn suggests in the case of Britain that the fact that the war was given credit for changes in 
female employment that were already well underway, may be attributed to the government's defining 
women workers as substitutes or replacements for men at the front, regardless of whether they had 
previously been employed. Women's work was treated as war service, but Thorn suggests that the 
patriotic motives encouraged by such slogans as "Do your Bit, Replace a Man for the Front" were not 
necessarily the actual motives for young women to go out to work: op.cit., pp. 301-7. 
71 Robert, op.cit., pp. 256-264. 
72 Mason, op.cit., p. 80. 
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working women who became icons of female emancipation, were in reality paid less 
than their male colleagues, had little status and almost certainly encountered sexual 
harrassment in the workplace.73 
If the literary flapper was a "lovely, expensive," idle, urban woman as F. Scott 
Fitzgerald described her, and indeed the flapper was a phenomenon of the middle and 
upper classes, the world of work remained a vital part of the new life she forged. If 
Zelda Fitzgerald chose to marry and play the role of beautiful muse for her writer 
husband, her flapper sisters, including her childhood :friend Tallulah Bankhead, 
prioritised careers as an integral part of the new lives they carved out in the urban 
space. Alexandra Kollontai wrote in 1920 that "the new woman could emerge as a 
type only with the growth in the number of women who were earning their own 
living. "74 Her socialist perspective saw women forced by capitalism to discard 
'feminine' virtues- which were futile in this new world- in a transformation of the 
female psyche that was "accomplished primarily and principally in the lower depths 
of society." In her view, the new woman was forged from the determination- born of 
hunger- of the working class woman, but the psychology of this woman was 
"reflected in the rest of her contemporaries" such that she set "the tone of life .. .in 
respect to the image of the woman of our time."75 
Work was a crucial dimension of the 'new' womanhood being created by 
women in cities. Women, especially women of the 'better'· classes, were not 
supposed to be single and self-reliant: they were supposed to be married, producing 
children, and contained in the domestic sphere. The flapper could not have existed 
outside the period's realignment of gender roles caused by economic changes that 
brought women into prominence in the city. The working woman, Commander 
observed by 1907, had claimed for others the right to a presence on the streets: "the 
73 In 1925 less than 1 percent of female white-collar workers held management positions, compared to 
6 percent of males: Bridenthal and Koonz, op.cit., pp. 51-2. Usbome noted that the New Woman in 
Germany was often depicted as using her sex appeal to gain promotion, and salesgirls were obsolete by 
the time they were thirty: Comelie Usbome, 'The New Woman and generational conflict: perceptions 
of young women's sexual mores in the Weimar Republic' in M. Roseman, Generations in Conflict: 
Youth Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany 1770-1968, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995, p. 142. Von Ankum notes that sexual harrassment was often depicted in popular culture, 
for example in G. W. Pabst's film The Joyless Street (1925), in which one of the female characters is 
propositioned by her boss: von Ankum, 'Gendered Urban Spaces,' p. 165. 
74 Kollontai, op.cit., p. 95. 
75 Ibid., pp. 95-101. 
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freedom she has won belongs not only to her class, but to all women who know how 
to conduct themselves as if they had business, whether they have or not."76 
However, if, as Kollontai suggested, capitalism was "wresting [women] away 
from the cradle" for their own survival, creating "a respect-demanding army of 
fighters" working outside the home, the idle urban woman was also failing to produce 
children for the nation.77 Commander had noted that "Wherever women are without 
employment and make a business of social life there is a low birthrate."78 The city 
encouraged recreation over re-creation, at least for those wealthy enough to live the 
life of pleasure and luxury denounced by the upholders of rural thrift and simplicity. 
Stanley Walker observed, "Soon after 1920 great, ravening hordes of women 
began to discover what their less respectable sisters had known for years- that it was 
a lot of fun ... to get soused. All over New York these up and coming females piled 
out of their hideaways, rang the bells of speakeasies, wheedled drugstores into selling 
them gin and rye, and even in establishments of great decorum begged their escorts 
for a nip from a hip flask."79 The new woman was visible in the speakeasy, and was 
also conspicuous as a consumer in the city, spending her income on fashion, cigarettes 
and visits to the cinema. 80 
The conditions associated with the woman as consumer were easily translated 
into the notion ofwoman as commodity.81 The presence of middle and upper class 
women in the city, for work or recreation, met with some discomfort in cultures still 
influenced by a dissolving bourgeois morality which assumed the prostitute to be the 
only "current, perceivable, and conceivable form of female presence on the street."82 
Nineteenth-century controls on prostitution had indicated a desire to separate out the 
'fallen' woman by defining 'red light' areas to facilitate surveillance, and setting up 
76 Commander, op.cit., p. 164. 
77 Kollontai, op.cit., pp. 98-9. 
78 Commander, op.cit., p. 198. 
79 Walker, op.cit., pp. 30-1. By 1925 the New York City Investigating Committee of Fourteen reported 
that the number of women in illegal speakeasies was 'astounding': Mowry and Brownell, op.cit., p. 25. 
80 Shearer West, 'Introduction' in Meskimmon and West, op.cit., p. 1. 
81 While women were perceived to be the main consumers of modem mass culture- what Siegfried 
Kracauer called the 'Cult of Distraction'- and mass-produced commodities like fashion, they were 
also used to sell these products: see Meskimmon, We Weren't Modern Enough, pp. 178-185. In Otto 
Dix's 1925 painting Three Women of the Street or Three Prostitutes of the Street, the ambiguous 
position of the woman in the public realm is suggested as the women, framed by the decorated shop 
window behind them, hover "both literally and metaphorically between the roles of commodity and 
consumer": Rowe, op.cit., p. 159. 
82 Anke Gleber, 'Female Flanerie and the Symphony of the City' in von Ankum, op.cit., p. 79. 
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special VD hospitals. 83 But immorality was becoming indefinable spatially. In Berlin 
Otto Dix and George Grosz were obsessed with representing the prostitute: in Dix' s 
'Big City Triptych' of 1927-8 he juxtaposed images of street prostitutes with women 
dancing to jazz music: good women and bad are barely distinguishable (figure 10). 
Fig.lO: Otto Db:, 'Big City Triptych~ 19.27~8 
To be a single woman in the public realm was to risk being categorised as 
sexually available, and probably a prostitute.84 The two artists conveyed the climate 
of violence towards women in evidence in postwar German urban culture, arising 
from pervasive social anxieties regarding the role of women in society. Grosz 
depicted the dismembering of prostitutes in his series of lustmords (sex murders), 
powerful "images of male inadequacy and revenge" set against the background of the 
metropolis.85 The woman who stepped outside the bounds of the private sphere, they 
seemed to say, would suffer the consequences. 
83 McMillan, op.cit., pp. 21-4. In 1909 a petition submitted to the Bremen Senate in Germany by a 
number of women's organisations had requested the repeal of the prostitution law which enforced the 
registering and regular medical checks of suspected prostitutes, appealing to the "serious danger to the 
entire world of working women, particularly to young single womel! in the cities": Elisabeth Meyer-
Renschausen, 'The Bremen Morality Scandal' in Bridenthal, et.al., p. 97. The war increased these 
controls in Germany: any woman alleged to have had relationships with several men in one month, 
whether or not she had received money, could be registered as a prostitute after only two warnings and 
subjected to compulsory- and sometimes fatal- treatment for VD (Us borne, 'Pregnancy is the 
woman's active service,' p. 392; Meyer-Renschausen, op.cit.,passim). 
84 Rowe, op.cit., p. 155. 
85 Peter Hall, Cities in Civilisation: Culture, Innovation and Urban Order, London: Phoenix Giant, 
1998, p. 273. Also see Beth Irwin Lewis, 'Lustmord: Inside the Windows of the Metropolis' in von 
Ankum, op.cit., pp. 202-232. Klaus Theweleit's studies of sexual aggressiveness in the letters and 
other writings of right-wing Freikorps fighters revealed this violent attitude towards women in the 
period: see Male Fantasies Volume I: Women, Floods, Bodies, History, translated by Stephen Conway, 
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If the big city presented dangers to women, it also offered the possibility of an 
exciting, expanded life. The urban woman was the ultimate symbol of modernity. 
Like the new cities and industries she inhabited, she moved faster. 86 The most daring 
were 'fast' or 'speeds'. R. S. W. Mendl described the age in terms ofthis faster beat, 
with its speeding motor cars and assembly lines in Ford's workshops, with its ladies 
who were "in so great a hurry that they wear short skirts which enable them to move 
fast and cut off their hair to save a few precious moments of the day ... "87 Women 
were associated with the assembly line, which had opened up semi-and unskilled 
work for them. 88 The British Tiller Girls and other dance troupes danced in lines with 
synchronised, 'machine-like' movements. 89 
The 1929 activity report of the Task force for the Recovery of the Volk linked 
rationalisation and industrialisation-- imported from America- with the disintegration 
of the "ethical idea ofmotherhood."90 Women themselves, to observers, were 
'rationalised,' efficient interchangeable parts functioning in the city of modernity. 
According to Hegel, independence and self-existence are only possible "by 
means of the sacrifice of what is universal."91 The new woman, synonomous with the 
hard, ruthless city, had abandoned her essential- 'universal'- mother- nature, in the 
eyes ofher critics, who assumed that she must, therefore, be wholly empty. In 1924 
the novelist Magdeleine Chaumont painted a grim picture of this new woman in the 
city: 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990, and Male Fantasies Vol. II: Psychoanalysing the 
White Terror, translated by Chris Turner, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989. Marsha Meskimrnon has also 
noted how an increase in violence against women coincided with their increased visibility in the public 
sphere: We Weren't Modern Enough, p. 41. 
86 The rationalisation and mechanisation of production on a large scale saw the advent of assembly-line 
production and new standards of speed, efficiency and productivity. New technology like the 
telephone, radio, and the automobile increased the tempo of life. 
87 Geoffrey C. Ward and Ken Bums, Jazz: A History of America's Music, Pirnlico: London, 2001, p. 
102. 
88 The assembly line requires less skill and creates a labour force of unskilled or semi-skilled workers: 
Renate Bridenthal, Atina Grossman, and Marion Kaplan, 'Introduction: Women in Weimar and Nazi 
Germany' in Bridenthal, et.al., p. 10. 
89 Siegfried Kracauer in 'The Mass Ornament' (1927) used the Tiller girls as an exemplary instance of 
'the physiognomy of the period': the girls were no longer individuals but a 'mass ornament,' a 
reflection of the capitalist production process which effaced the individuality of the worker. The 
"Tiller Girls' legs correspond to the hands in the factory". See David Frisby, Fragments of Modernity: 
Theories of Modernity in the Work of Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985, 
fJ'· 147-49. 
Hausen, op.cit., p. 140. 
"Observe in any public place the expression that all women wear upon their 
faces. Do we see one who is kind, dreamy, or satisfied? No, they all have features 
that are shut, hard, spiteful. .. Put simply, women are becoming nasty, 
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aggressive ... there is no longer either the heart of the mother or that of the daughter or 
lover. There is the dried-out heart of la femme moderne; the universal heart has 
become a desert.',n 
91 Hegel, op.cit., p. 518. 
92 Roberts, op.cit., p. 76, my emphasis. 
Chapter 3 
The Flapper: "the young woman who follows the fashion 
in all things: no child, etc."1 
"Any real girl. .. who has the vitality of young womanhood, who feels 
pugilistically inclined when called the "weaker sex," who resents being put on a 
pedestal and worshipped from afar, who wants to get into things herself, is a 
flapper ... The flapper is the girl who is responsible for the advancement of woman's 
condition in the world." (Letter to the editor, Daily Illini, Apri120, 1922)2 
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"These beings- without breasts, without hips ... who smoke, work, argue and 
fight exactly like boys, and who ... seek out savory and acrobatic pleasures on the 
plush seats of 5 horsepower Citroens- these aren't young girls! There aren't any 
more young girls! No more women either!" (Parisian law student, 1925)3 
The term 'flapper' had originated in late-eighteenth-century England to describe 
a young, awkward duck or partridge finding its wings. It was taken up in a figurative 
sense, by 1900, to refer to an immoral, unsteady or flighty young woman who lacked 
decorum. Significantly, the term could also simply mean 'young girl. ' 4 The iconic 
flapper of the 1920s wore fashions associated with youth: straight dresses and short 
skirts- which reached the top of the knee in 19275 - were associated with girlhood. 
The 'Gibson Girl', the ideal female type of the American 1890s, had long hair, broad 
hips, a large bust and a narrow waist. 6 The flapper was her antithesis. She was · 
(ideally) lean and athletic, with small breasts. Her dresses had straight lines and were 
short and plain, with a low waist (figure 11). She bobbed her hair in boyish fashion 
(figure 12) and led a trend towards greater familiarity between the sexes. 
1 Quote from Clement Vautel, Madame ne veut pas d'enfant (1924), in Roberts, op.cit., p. 135. 
2 Paula S. Fass, The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the 1920s, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1977, p. 291. 
3 Roberts, op.cit., p. 20. 
4 The Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, Volume V, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1989, p. 1008. 
5 Paul H. Nystrom, Economics of Fashion, New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1928, p. 394; 
Kenneth A. Yellis, 'Prosperity's Child: Some Thoughts on the Flapper', American Quarterly Vol. XXI 
(1969),p. 59. 
Fig. 12: Louise Br-ooks: bobbed halr 
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Fig. 11' :The straight silhouette 
of flapper style 
The flapper had rejected Louisa May Alcott's version of femininity. Marjorie in 
Fitzgerald's 'Bernice Bobs Her Hair' protests 'Oh, please don't quote "Little Women" 
... That's out of style ... What modem woman could live like those inane females?" 
6 Yellis, op.cit., p. 44. The 'Gibson Girl' ideal was based on Charles Dana Gibson's drawings of his 
Accused ofbeing hard and selfish, she continues, "The womanly woman! ... Her 
whole life is occupied in whining criticisms of girls like me who really do have a 
good time."7 
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The 'new man' who depicted the flapper and seemingly idealised her, in fact 
betrayed ambiguous attitudes about the new womanhood she had forged. F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, despite his 'creation' of the flapper, harboured deeply ambivalent feelings 
about the new woman he chronicled, and her sexual permissiveness. His heroes are 
set upon by these "masked destroyers," seemingly innocent women whose face 
powder symbolises their corruption in the suggestion of the foul dust of the sterile 
wasteland between East Egg and the city in The Great Gatsby. 8 Fitzgerald, fascinated 
with Zelda's unconventionality, had "married the heroine of my stories."9 But his 
embracing of 'urban' progressive values was ambiguous and confused. On one hand 
he criticised Zelda for lack of ambition and was attracted to prominent, successful 
women, pillorying women who felt "more at home in a kitchen than in a ballroom." 
Yet he also believed that "being in love, really in love- doing it well- is work 
enough for a woman," and castigated Zelda for her lack of domesticity. 10 Ernest 
Hemingway also demanded subservience from the women in his life, despite creating 
'indestructible' women like Lady Brett in The Sun Also RisesY 
The ambivalence of the 'new man' to these women was particularly 
pronounced when it came to issues of sexuality and procreativity, as evidenced in 
Fitzgerald's denunciation of his wife's "chill-mindedness." A similar undertone 
wife. 
7 F. Scott Fitzgerald, 'Bernice Bobs Her Hair' (1920) in Bernice Bobs Her Hair and Other Stories, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963, pp. 17-18. 
8 Joan M. Allen, Candles and Carnival Lights: the Catholic Sensibility of F. Scott Fitzgerald, New 
York: New York University Press, 1978, pp. 73, 110. 
9 Matthew J. Broccoli, Scottie Fitzgerald Smith and Joan P. Kerr (eds.), The Romantic Egoists, New 
York: Charles Scribners Sons, 197 4, p. 79. 
10 Ibid., p. 97. Zelda provided Fitzgerald with material for his fiction through her diaries, which he 
'cannibalised' as early as 1919 while attempting to sabotage Zelda's own creative career by prompting 
Scribner's publishing house to poorly package and promote her Save Me the Waltz. See Taylor, op.cit., 
pp. 13, 51, 61, and 72-3, and Koula Svokos Hartnett, Zelda Fitzgerald and the Failure of the American 
Dream for Women, New York: Peter Lang Publishmg, 1991, pp. 133-4. The 'American dream for 
women' was to attain a Prince Charming to rescue her and prevent the necessity of her having to work 
for a living. In 1921 Zelda said that "I think a woman gets more happiness out ofbemg gay, light-
hearted, unconventional, mistress of her own fate, than out of a career that calls for hard work, 
mtellectual pessimism and loneliness ... flappers are brave, gay and beautiful": ibid., p. 113. Zelda 
found too late that dancing on tables at the Waldorf and being the most famous flapper of all was not 
enough. She wanted to build an independent identity as a ballet dancer, a dream which failed because 
she was too old. 
characterised Bertolt Brecht's recording in his diary of his reaction to his girlfriend 
aborting his child: "I could strangle that whore! .. .I've never seen such a naked 
display of the prostitute's bag of tricks ... " 12 
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This suggestion of a blurring of boundaries between women morally was an 
issue of class. The sexual woman in literature had traditionally been depicted as 
having crawled out of the working class, and her moral dissolution was taken as read. 
Now girls of the middle and upper classes claimed the same sexual freedoms. 13 
Respectable women seized other prerogatives ofthe disreputable woman, like 
smoking: a trademark ofthe flapper (figure 13).14 
The frank use of make-up, 
previously confined to prostitutes, was 
adopted by women in great numbers. "By 
appropriating the right to use such sexual 
aids," Pass argued, "respectable women 
proclaimed that they too were endowed 
with a sexual personality."15 
If the period before the war had seen Theda 
Bara as cinematic vamp held up in 
opposition to a virginal 'mother-wife' 
Lillian Gish or Mary Pickford, presenting a 
"choice between evolution and 
degeneration," the 1920s saw a breakdown 
of the division between bad girl and good 
girl, a blurring of lines in which the flapper 
was an important figure. 16 
Fig. 13: The flapper's adoption 
of the prerogatives of 
the disreplltable woman: 
smoking 
11 Bernice Kert, The Hemingway Women, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1983; Mimi Reisel 
Gladstein, The Indestructible Woman in Faulkner, Hemingway, and Steinbeck, Ann Arbor: UMI 
Research Press, 1986. 
12 Brecht's diaries, entry of9 May 1921, quoted in Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Vol. I, pp. 163-4. 
13 Studies suggested, furthermore, that this pre-marital experimentation did not necessarily interfere 
with a woman's chance of future marriage. See Usborne, 'The New Woman and generational conflict,' 
p. 157. 
14 Though bohemian women and prostitutes had smoked in public before the 1920s, this was taboo for 
respectable women. Fass has noted in the case of America that smoking was morally value-laden and 
had sexual connotations: op.cit., pp. 293-300. 
15 Ibid., p. 284. 
16 See Di_jkstra on Theda Bara's role as the 'vampire', or sexual woman who sexually entices the model 
man and destroys him in the 1915 film A Fool There Was: op.cit., pp. 9-13, and p. 40 on the opposition 
between the passive, maternal wife in the film and the 'degenerate' vamp. 
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If in the theatre of 1925 Tallulah Bankhead could choose between playing "the 
wife or the prostitute in Lonsdale's Spring Cleaning, or the wife or the tart in 
Tarnish," those who strove to depict contemporary womanhood themselves, like F. 
Scott Fitzgerald, were at a loss to adjust to a world in which "Dark Lady and Fair, 
witch and redeemer [had] fallen together" to create "intermediate types."17 
Fitzgerald's flapper was a 'good girl' if a little 'fast,' the daughter of the most 
exemplary parents, who had acquired the sexual prowess of the vamp (figure 14).18 
''My goo' ness-!' m jilrt!" 
Fig. 14: The 1nice girP who i$ a little •fast' 
17Tallulah Bankhead, Tallulah: My Autobiography, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952, p. 144; 
Leslie A. Fiedler, Love and Death in the American Novel, New York: Criterion Books, 1960, pp. 301-
2; Thomas noted that "fifty years ago we recognised, roughly speaking, two types of women, the one 
good and the other completely bad,- what we now call the old-fashioned girl, and the girl who had 
sinned and been outlawed. At present we have several intermediate types, - the occasional prostitute, 
the charity girl [girls who justified sexual intimacy by saying they intended to marry the man, or that 
they would marry in the event of pregnancy], the demi-virgin, the equivocal flapper, and in addition 
girls with new social behaviour norms who have adapted themselves to all kinds of work": op.cit., pp. 
230-31. Fass quotes an American college professor on the subject who said that once, "one might with 
safety say this woman is good, this one is bad. That was in the days when the bad woman was known 
by her extreme clothing and her artificial aids to excite the sex impulse. But when a large portion of our 
'respectable' women adopt the same methods ... a man is scarcely to be blamed if he sometimes makes 
a mistake in judgement": op.cit., p. 309. 
18 E. Stevenson wrote, "The generic flapper is a nice girl who is a little fast, who takes the breath of 
staid observers with her flip spontaneity, her short-lived likes and dislikes, her way of skating gaily 
over thin ice": Babbitts and Bohemians: The American 1920s, New York: Macmillan, 1967, p. 141. 
H. L. Mencken wrote that "The veriest schoolgirl today knows as much as the midwife of 1885," and 
Malcolm Cowley noted that girls at Smith College in New York modelled themselves on Hemingway's 
hard-drinking, promiscuous Lady Brett: Leuchtenburg, op.cit., pp. 171-2. 
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The flapper was characterised by her politically significant rejection of the 
values and behaviours instilled in her. As Kollontai noted, while the struggle of the 
working class woman for autonomy coincided with the interests of her class, the 
woman of the bourgeoisie faced greater opposition, because the "ideology of their 
class is hostile to the transformation of the feminine type."19 In her rejection of the 
paradigm of femininity associated with sexual passivity, fecundity and maternal love, 
the flapper staged a counter-ideological rebellion, a rebellion made all the more potent 
by the extreme natalism of the period. 
Mayer reminds us that women are representatives of purity in the national 
project. Symbolic status is connected to their reproductive role; their moral fortitude 
is conceived as vital to the nation. 20 The task of traditional femininity was to act as a 
guardian of morality, and to foster it in the domestic setting by acting as an example 
to children. The 'new morality' celebrated and bemoaned in the 1920s was associated 
with changes in the sexual behaviours of the daughters of the middle classes. Thomas 
noted that it was among girls of the "well-to-do" that the "new type" had emerged, a 
type characterised by "seeming innocence [and] sexual sophistication."21 'Flapperish' 
young women of the bourgeoisie appeared to adopt the relative sexual freedoms of 
their working-class sisters, claiming a pre-marital sexual life as men had always done. 
If the mother acted as a symbol of hope for post-war regeneration, the flapper was a 
symbol of moral decay. 
Stefan Zweig had been shocked by his experience of young bourgeois girls in 
Berlin who "bragged proudly of their perversion, to be sixteen and still under 
suspicion of virginity would have been considered a disgrace ... every girl wanted to 
be able to tell of her adventures and the more exotic, the better.'m The popularisation 
of psychoanalysis in the 1920s, especially in America, saw young women who were 
"hipped on Freud and all that" venting their sexual energies for the sake of their 
health. 23 Magazines like Flapper Experiences chronicled the new sexual 
19 Kollontai, op.cit., p. 100, my emphasis. 
20 Mayer, op.cit., p. 82. 
21 Thomas, op.cit., p. 84. 
22 Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday: An Autobiography, New York: The Viking Press, 1943, p. 
313. 
23 Leuchtenburg, op.cit., p. 165. Freud's theories in their popularised form were subjects of common 
knowledge: by 1922 Elsie Clews Parsons could write that, "There is no need in this post-Freudian day 
of dwelling upon the effects of suppression of sex instinct or impulse. Suppression leads, we are 
told ... to perversion or disease": 'Sex' in Stearns, op.cit., p. 311. In Gentlemen Prefer Blondes Lorelei 
permissiveness of youth, and Hollywood advertised films featuring "beautiful jazz 
babies, champagne baths, midnight revels, [and] petting parties in the purple dawn" 
while moulding Clara Bow into the 'It' gir1.24 (figure 15) 
Fig. 15: Chu·a Bow, the •It' Girl,, 
in the screen ve.rsion of the 
l9241!1:t play Dtmcing Mothers, 
'in wlticb the flapper Kittens 
enjoys cocktails for lunch 
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Reactions to the flapper's rejection of the hallmarks of traditional femininity 
speak loudly of her contemporary importance. Although the flapper was represented 
as being interested only in sexual adventures, in pleasing and shocking men, and in 
fashion, the vehemence of the opposition she faced suggests hers was more than a 
frivolous rebellion. Dorothy Parker had written, "The playful flapper here we see, I 
The fairest of the fair I She's not what Grandma used to be, -I You might say, au 
contraire."25 The flapper's contrariety, her self-will, was the mainspring ofthe 
resentment she aroused. She behaved in ways that were contrary to what was 
expected or logically understood ofwomen, according to tradition. She defied the 
established way ofbeing a woman. 
If this established femininity was defined by warmth and nurture, the flapper 
was cold: at least in the eyes of observers. Roberts has argued that cultural 
is introduced to "Dr. Froyd" who warned her of the dangers of inhibitions and "seemed very very 
intreged (sic.)at a girl who always seemed to do everything she wanted to do": Anita Loos, Gentlemen 
Prefer Blondes, London: Penguin, 1992 (1925), p. 18 
24 Leuchtenburg, op.cit., 168. 
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perceptions about female coldness were rooted in the gendered divisions of war, and 
the perception of veterans that the homefront, especially in urban areas, was 
characterised by its gaiety and luxury in utter contrast to the battleground. The 
perception that women were busy liberating themselves while men were increasingly 
subjugated to the war machine, and that they were indifferent to the man's anguish, 
pervaded post-war literature in France. In Paul Geraldy's Le Guerre Madame (1916), 
a soldier on leave visits an ex-lover in Paris, who complains about her boredom with 
the Paris night life. The cover of a 1919 novel juxtaposed a woman applying make-up 
with a map of the Western front. 26 In Colette's The Last of Cheri (1926) Cheri is a 
broken, listless figure in comparison to his coolly efficient wife Edmee, whose 
independence and chilly attitude to her husband is in stark contrast to her 'feminine,' 
clinging pre-war character in Cheri.27 The new woman, newly independent, efficient, 
and seemingly preoccupied, seemed to have no comfort to offer the man or nation. 
The intrusion of greater numbers of women in civic space and industry saw a 
conflation of women not just with the city, but with the machine. The pivotal scene in 
Fritz Lang's film Metropolis (1926), a brutal fantasy of the city of the future, saw the 
'good' Maria (Bridget Helm) turned into a robot, a mechanised whore with a metal 
pageboy.28 This image of the new woman as a 'rationalised', machine-like arm of 
technological modernity reflected a pervasive anxiety about a "psychic and spiritual 
dematernalization ofwomen."29 Roberts has argued that for many observers, the 
modem woman signified a colder, more impersonal world. 30 
Although the promiscuity of the new woman was bemoaned, men complained 
that women were cold and out of reach. In literature of the period, men searched in 
vain for pity from women, for a barely-remembered maternal warmth, and found only 
a cut-glass bowl, Fitzgerald's famous symbol- Carleton Canby tells Evelyn, 'I'm 
going to give [you] a present that's as hard as you are and as beautiful and as empty 
25 Dorothy Parker, 'The Flapper' quoted in 'Flapper Culture and Style' at 
http://www .geocities.comli1apper _culture/ 
26 Roberts, op. cit., pp. 22-45 on la femme moderne as a symbol of moral and gender trauma arising 
from the upheaval of war. 
27 Cheri (1919) and The Last of Cheri ( 1926), in Short Novels of Colette, New York: Dial Press, 1951. 
28 See Michael Minden, 'The city in early cinema: Metropolis, Berlin, and October' in Edward Timms 
and David Kelley (eds.), Unreal City: Urban experience in modern European literature and art, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985, pp. 193-213; J. Lungstrum, 'Metropolis and the 
Technosexual Woman of German Modernity' in von Aukum, op.cit., pp. 128-144. 
29 As the Nazi newspaper Volkischer Beobachter put it in 1929. Quoted in Hausen, op.cit., p. 145. 
30 Roberts, op.cit., p. 75. 
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and as easy to see through."31 John Dos Passos' Manhattan Transfer (1927) depicted 
shallow female life in an urban wasteland: Emile associates his own depression and 
the loneliness of the city with the new woman's cold materialism: "Everything is so 
hard. Women look in your pocket not in your heart .. .I can't stand it anymore."32 
Ellen is untouchable, an "intricate machine of saw tooth steel": she "sits up cold and 
out of reach like a lighthouse. Men's hands crawl like bugs on the unbreakable glass. 
Men's looks blunder and flutter against it helpless as moths."33 Representations of 
women as hard-edged, cold, and efficient had their basis in the perception that young 
women were rejecting maternity and its attendant qualities of nurture and softness.34 
Representations of ardent men being rejected by cold or simply superficial 
young women betrayed a fascination with the flapper's utter rejection of the 
'Sentimental Love Religion' (figures 16-17).35 
HE (passionately): You are trying to jorgtt me! 
"N(r-/'m trying U> remember 'jrJll." 
Fig. 16: The ardent young nmn 
and tbe cold flapper 
31 F. Scott Fitzgerald, 'The Cut-Glass Bowl' in Flappers and Philosophers, New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1920, p. 97. 
32 John Dos Passos, Manhattan Transfer, London: Constable and Co., 1933 (1927), p. 85. The 
'flapper-as-gold-digger' theme pervaded literature: Lorelei Lee in Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (op.cit.) 
was a more light-hearted example of the kept woman. 
33Dos Passos, op.cit., pp. 215 and 171. 
34 Feminist theory has long held that an essentialist conception of femininity as synonymous with 
nurture has contributed to female subordination: Everingham noted that a female-centered perspective 
is often assumed to be grounded in an ethics of care and greater concern for the needs of others. See C. 
Everingham, Motherhood and Modernity: an investigation into the rational dimension of mothering, 
Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994, p. 4. 
Fig. 17: Tbe flapper's :rejection of the 
'Sentimental Love Religion' 
Breaking It ·Gl.llltly 
HE; 1 thought we were ena:aBed? 
SHE: We were. 
Rosalind in Fitzgerald's This Side of Paradise told Amory, 
"There used to be two kinds of kisses. First when girls 
were engaged and deserted; second, when they were engaged. 
Now there's a third kind, where the man is kissed and deserted. 
IfMr Jones of the nineties bragged he'd kissed a girl, everyone 
knew he was through with her. IfMr Jones of 1919 brags the 
same everyone knows it's because he can't kiss her anymore."36 
Tallulah Banld1ead (figure 18), recalling her "ecstatic affairs" in London in the 
1920s, admitted she was "incapable of sustained ardors," and Donald Stewart 
complained ofhis ex-lover Dorothy Parker that her gaiety was "her emotion; she 
wasn't worrying about your emotion."37 According to Zelda Fitzgerald, the 
flapper was "reticent emotionally and courageous morally."38 She had dispensed 
with 'maidenly reserve' and the double standard.39 As women sighted the 
35Fiedler, op.cit., p. 221. 
36 F. Scott Fitzgerald, This Side of Paradise, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1920, p. 165. 
37Bankhead, op.cit., p. 163; Marion Meade, Dorothy Parker: What Fresh Hell Is This?, New York: 
Villard Books, 1988. p. 142. 
38 F. Scott Fitzgerald and Zelda Sayre Fitzgerald, 'What Became of Our Flappers and Sheiks?' in 
McCall's Magazine LIII: 1 (Oct. 1925), p. 30. 
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39 McGovern, op.cit., p. 323; Alexandra Kollontai observed that "The 'rebellion' of women against a 
one-sided sexual morality is one of the most sharply delineated traits of the new heroine": op.cit., p. 93. 
possibility of financial independence, they had less time for romantic notions of 
romance and courtship that assumed the primacy of love and marriage in their 
lives. The new woman's feelings and mental energies, Kollontai noted, were 
directed upon other things in life but sentimental love feelings. 40 
Fig. 18: Tal:lulab Bankhead11 who fled to New York and then London to 
find fame 
59 
The earlier sacralistion of romantic love had been an important aspect of the 
'Cult of True Womanhood,' which had judged women according to their piety, purity 
40 Ibid., p. 7. 
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and submissiveness- themes that were associated with the maternal role and 
containment in the home, where Henry James' 'Pure Maidens' had remained 
uncorrupted by the realities of the world.41 The True Woman had been defined by her 
dependence, but more importantly by her selflessness: in 1905 Theodore Roosevelt 
said of the mother, "her very name stands for loving unselfishness and self-
abnegation, and, in any society fit to exist, is fraught with associations which render it 
holy."42 By 1910 Margaret Deland wondered, "Can we remember that selflessness, 
and see no difference between it and the present feminine individualism?"43 
The flapper was not entirely a product of the war, as some writers have 
argued. She was in many respects the natural heir to the 'Ibsen woman' who had 
insisted on her right to an independent existence from the late nineteenth century, and 
the suffragette who had insisted this existence be recognised in law. The flapper 
actually lived the natural outcomes of these movements. The startling opposition to 
this life expressed by critics arose from the recognition that the flapper represented 
the irreversibility of the gains of feminism. 
The flapper was, in the eyes of many observers, defined by her rejection of 
motherhood and its hallmarks. Fitzgerald's female characters objected to the 
domestic life: Gloria in The Beautiful and Damned doesn't want "responsibility and a 
lot of children to take care of." She insists that "one owes as much to the current 
generation as to one's unwanted children."44 Fitzgerald's wayward teens were 
horrifYingly eclipsed by women like Nancy Cunard, the promiscuous heiress to a 
shipping line fortune, who underwent an elective hysterectomy in 1920 to avoid 
pregnancy.45 Dos Passos depicted his female characters coldly undergoing abortions: 
"It won't take very long, will it? If I can only pull myself together I have an 
engagement for tea at five."46 However, people feared the flapper would make an 
irresponsible mother: when Dorothy Parker became pregnant, one sceptic questioned 
whether it was possible for Dorothy ''to have anything in common with children 
because they didn't drink." Contemporaries predicted that the child would emerge 
41 Welter, op.cit., 151-174; Fiedler, op.cit., p. 290. 
42 Quoted in Bell and Offen, op.cit., p. 140. 
43 Deland, op.cit., p. 292. 
44 Fitzgerald, The Beautiful and Damned, pp. 37 and 124. 
45 Taylor, op.cit., pp. 162-3. 
46 Dos Passos, op.cit., p. 252. 
'tight,' having formed in utero a habit for martinis and French brandy, and would 
need a cup of coffee.47 
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The French theorist Leroy-Beaulieu and his followers attributed depopulation 
to the rise of a "neo-pagan egoism and pursuit of pleasure" bred by civilisation.48 The 
flapper's desire to lead a life of pleasure, as it appeared to her critics, was the mark of 
her moral sterility, the triumph of egotism over her sense of duty. Reactions to the 
flapper linked her 'moral sterility' to biological sterility. One commentator, in a 1925 
comment in the French Progres Civique, asserted, "These unhappy women do not 
want to be mothers because they do not dare to confess that they are sterile, sterile in 
their heart and in their feelings."49 Monique Lerbier's spiritually and emotionally 
empty life of promiscuity in Paris was ultimately mirrored in her inability to conceive 
a child in Victor Margueritte's La Gan;onne (1922).50 
With young women interacting more freely with men and taking on their 
"independent ways,"51 fears multiplied regarding the apparent blurring of crucial 
boundaries between men and women. Clement Vautel' s novel Madame ne veut pas 
d'enfant (1924) contained an ominous prediction that, "We are moving towards the 
suppression of the sexes ... The human being will soon be neither man nor woman ... he 
will unite the attributes ofboth ... "52 A clear demarcation between male and female 
was upheld as a cultural ideal by critics of the flapper. The perceived 
'masculinisation' of women was a problem ofthe perversion of sexuality, a symptom 
of cultural decline, but more importantly in this period it implied the degeneration of 
fecundity. The flapper's demand for a life equal in self-sufficiency and value to those 
of men destabilised a balance between the sexes viewed as vital to production of 
children. 
47 Meade, op.cit., p. 264. 
48 Spengler, France Faces Depopulation, p. 8. Rageot's La Natalite similarly depicted poor natality as 
sign of psychological decadence: Roberts, op.cit., p. 125. The 'social woman' who devoted her life to 
leisure pursuits had long been a cause of complaint. In fue American educational film of 1916, Where 
are My Children? a respectable District Attorney drives his wife and her 'brainless' socialite friends 
from fue house after he discovers she has denied him children by secretly undergoing abortions. 
Depictions of the souls of children in Heaven after an abortion scene were titled "a social butterfly is 
again ready for house parties": R. Eberwein, Sex Ed: Film, Video, and the Framework of Desire, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1999, pp. 54-5. 
49 Roberts, op.cit., p. 130. 
50 Ibid., pp. 46-54. 
51 Ibid., p. 139. 
52 Ibid., p. 134. 
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It has been claimed that clothing is a visual language, in that it makes clear 
reference to who we are and how we wish to be taken. 53 Perhaps more significantly, 
as Paul H. Nystrom noted in 1928, fashion is the result of"common mental activity, 
of like thinking by many people."54 A reluctance to view fashion as a serious field of 
enquiry probably contributed to a historiographical dismissal of the flapper, who in 
historical and popular memory is synonymous with her clothes. If the highly 
decorative, impractical fashions worn by Thorstein Veblen's leisured bourgeois wives 
signified to the world their idleness, 55 the clothes worn by the flapper were made for 
work, motion, and city life. 
The clothes the flapper wore indicated her refusal to play 'mother of the nation,' 
her insistence on her right to live a life defined outside biological function, as men 
did. By 1930, observing the narrowing ofthe gulfbetween the sexes, John C. Fliigel 
could note in his The Psychology of Clothes that, "There seems to be ... no essential 
factor in the nature, habits, or functions of the two sexes that would necessitate a 
striking difference of costume - other than the desire to accentuate sex differences 
themselves ... "56 Havelock Ellis reflected in 1931 that all the changes of the past 
decade regarding the lives of women had been the outcome of a single movement: the 
movement for making them the companions of men. The flapper's desire to be "the 
social equal and companion of man, whether in work or play, even perhaps in the play 
of sex" was witnessed "even by her hair and her skirts and the simple fashion of her 
garments."57 
A cultural anxiety about the difficulty of telling men and women apart was 
apparent in cartoons and drawings of the period. In the cover illustration for Madame 
ne veut pas d 'enfant the lounging male and female figures are virtually 
indistinguishable in physiognomy and dress (figures 19-20).58 
53 Fred Davis, Fashion, Culture, and Identity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 1 and 
passim. 
54 Nystrom, op.cit., p. 55 (my emphasis). 
55 Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, London: Allen and Unwin, 1957 (1899). 
56 Quoted in Yellis, op.cit., p. 53. 
57 Havelock Ellis, 'The Function of Taboos' in More Essays of Love and Virtue, London: Constable 
and Co., 1931, pp. 88-89. The designs of Gabrielle Chanel adapted sportswear to daily life, freeing the 
body for an idealised lifestyle of athletic recreation, flitting from engagement to engagement, and 
dancing all night. The Chanellook was also a classless look, contributing to the perceived difficulty of 
classifying 'good' and 'bad' women. Her designs were quickly copied and mass-produced, making 
them accessible and inexpensive. See Elizabeth Wilson, Adorned in Dreams: Fashion and Modernity, 
London: Virago Press, p. 41. 
58 Roberts, op.cit., p. 135. 
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Louise, the polar opposite to the selfish Elyane, proclaims that she is a "real 
woman" with long hair, breasts and hips -who "doesn't cheat and play around with 
her sex".59 The flapper's attempt to 'disguise' her reproductive capacity was 
associated with her appropriation of masculine styles: a disturbing and hugely 
59 Ibid., p. 135. 
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important cultural phenomenon that was received with trepidation. 60 Both male and 
female commentators received it as an expression of cultural crisis: one women's 
magazine denounced the trend towards androgyny as "morally embarrassing for male 
feelings."61 The gar<;onne style was not simply a fashion but an effective "occupying 
[of] the space ofboth sexes at once."62 (figures 21-3) 
Fig. 21: The g::m;onne l.ook 
Fashion attracted disproportionate attention in the 
1920s because the flapper's clothes indicated her 
rejection of the traditional idea of womanhood. As 
Wilson said of fashion, it is in "this marginalised area 
of the contingent, the decorative, the futile, that not 
simply a new aesthetic but a new cultural order might 
seed itself."63 Critics of flapper fashion joined other 
voices demanding the complete psychic and 
phsiological separation of the sexes. According to a 
prominent German gynaecologist, "where there is true 
culture the sexes move away from one another and 
develop their differences to the extreme."64 Demands 
for sexual differentiation can be understood in light of 
the influence of evolutionary theory. Following 
Darwin, the biologist Patrick Geddes had seen the 
character of woman as dominated by tenderness and 
selflessness, arising from her maternal instincts. 
6
° For example, a 1925 article in the German magazine BIZ, entitled "Now That's Enough! Against the 
Masculinization of Women" denounced the fashion as an "embarrassing aberration": see Petro, op.cit., 
p. 105. The significance of aspects of androgyny in fashion is itself a hotly contested issue: Davis 
notes how the symbolic effect of the style is to "dramatize cross-gender tensions, not resolve them," a 
position which would cast the flapper in an antagonistic role. However, other observers, including 
feminists, have regarded 'boyish' fashions for women not as symbols of sexual equality, but as subtle 
devices to mute egalitarian demands, with an undertone of appeal to a latent homoerotic impulse in 
men: casting the androgynous woman not as equal but as immature boy to dominant man. See Davis, 
op.cit., pp. 35-7 and Shearer West, 'Introduction' in Meskinnnon and West, op.cit., p. 6. 
61 Usbome, 'The New Woman and Generational Conflict', p. 144. 
62 West, op.cit., p. 6. Also see Sabine Hake, 'In The Mirror of Fashion' in von Ankum, op.cit., p. 196. 
The garvonne look was overtly sexual, as opposed to the more mainstream athletic look adopted by 
young women. It was associated with sexual deviance, specifically with the lesbian subculture, as has 
been noted in the case of Berlin: see Petro, op.cit., p. 109 and Meskimmon, We Weren't Modern 
Enough, ch. 5. 
63 Wilson, Adorned in Dreams, p. 245. 
64 Quoted in Lynne Frame, 'Gretchen, Girl, Garvonne? Weimar Science and Popular Culture in Search 
of the Ideal New Woman' in von Aukum, op.cit., p. 19. 
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The altruism of the woman was a necessary partner to the egoism ofthe man, 
creating a "harmonious blending" crucial to man's rise on the evolutionary ladder. 
The woman's rejection ofher evolutionary task of passivity and altruism would 
destroy the species.65 
66 
William Sumner had theorised that civilisation should create good wives, and 
that vamps- strong, independent women- were products of a degenerative society. 66 
The "bourgeois cosmos" examined by Nye rested on sharp sexual differentiation, 
which came to be emphasised in medical discourse at the time of the consolidation of 
the separate spheres in France after 1789, to exclude women from the public realm. 
Domesticity was understood to be the "socially functional analogue of the biological 
function ofmatemity."67 The collapse of the opposite and complementary roles of 
the sexes would disturb a balance seen as crucial to the whole process of social 
reproduction, and devastate natality: "the masculinsation of women must gradually 
affect the birthrate. "68 
. Short hair was another masculine prerogative under siege by the flapper. 
Bobbed hair- the bubikopf in Germany, the 'Eton crop' in England, the '~da Jeanne 
d'Arc' in France and the 'Ponjola' bob, fashionable in the United States69 - was the 
trademark of the emancipated woman in the city. The hairstyle became a political 
controversy. For htmdreds of years women's hair had been long, and conservatives 
viewed it as the crown of womanhood, denouncing short hair as another indication of 
65 Fraser Harrison, The Dark Angel: Aspects of Victorian Sexuality, New York: Universe Books, 1977, 
pp. 90-97. The influence of Darwin and his followers was seen in the pronouncements of social 
feminists like Jane Addams in the United States, who argued that women's special skills and virtues 
were required to bring about cooperation in a male capitalist world of aggression and competition. See 
Brown, op.cit., pp. 33-4. 
66 D"k . 33 IJ stra, op.clt., p. . 
67 Nye, op.cit., p. 52. 
68 Leroy-Beaulieu quoted in Cole, op.cit., p. 669. In nineteenth-century popular culture and medicine, 
human fertility was thought to rest on the logic of complementarity. The greater the sexual difference 
between a couple, the more certain they could be of a fertile union. A French medical work by J. J. 
Virey, Da !a femme (1825) advised that the ideal couple consisted of"the most female woman and the 
most virile man, when a dark, hairy, dry, hot and impetuous male finds the other sex delicate, moist, 
smooth and white, timid and modest": Nye, op.cit., p. 59. Popular articles in Weimar Germany 
advising men on their choice of a wife recommended women with rounded physiques and warned 
against angular- 'unfeminine'- women, who according to the best 'scientific' knowledge of the day 
were sure to be temperamental and difficult to manage. The gyneacologist P. Mathes, in an influential 
1924 work on female constitutional types, argued that while the 'real' or 'complete' woman was 
rounded in physique, the "intersexual" woman- characterised by her slim, athletic build and unstable 
psyche, was "deficiently differentiated" - and likely to suffer physical complications in birth or even 
infertility, leading to marital disaster (Frame, op.cit., pp. 12-40). Also see Petro, Joyless Streets, pp. 
119-21 
69 The ponjola, which had been popularised by Irene Castle and worn by Zelda Fitzgerald, was radical 
enough to keep women out ofNew York's fashionable restaurants in 1918: Taylor, op.cit., p. 95. 
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cultural decline.70 Bobbed hair was attacked as a symbol of female promiscuity and 
self-conscious denial of the domestic ideal. Drieu la Rochelle saw "women ... cutting 
their hair as a sign of sterility ... "71 
The trend towards youthful slimness and emphasis of the limbs instead of the 
midsections of the female form suggested a rejection of the nurturing role. Maturity 
was concealed: some women even bound their breasts to achieve a pre-pubescent, or 
boyish, look.72 The aesthetic ideal of the flapper was youth.73 Given the anxieties 
about gender roles that marked the period, this was construed as a rejection of the 
consummation of 'normal' female sexual development, ie. matemity.74 
Flapper fashion, as another French natalist interpreted it, was the "fashion of 
non-nursing ... the fashion ofnon-motherhood."75 For contemporaries, the clothes 
worn by the flapper indicated, and were symbolic of, the new idea of womanhood she 
was forging, a womanhood defined - in the perceptions of panicked nationalists -by 
her rejection of motherhood. Hysterical reactions to the flapper's symbolic rejection 
of motherhood, and by extension womanhood itself as it had been understood, suggest 
that the rebellion she effected had ramifications that stretched beyond the need to 
raise the birth rate. 
70 Yellis, op.cit., p. 48; Hake, op.cit., p. 186. 
71 Quoted in Roberts, op.cit., pp. 74-5. 
72 Leuchtenburg, op.cit., p. 172. 
73 The leaning towards an idealisation of the immature or umipe in the female form did not erase the 
erotic connotations of feminine dress. Fashion was therefore seen as symbolic of the kind of sterile 
promiscuity with which the flapper was associated. As Fass noted, more informal interaction between 
the sexes fostered the "cultivation of styles that operated on a purely sexual level." The fashion and 
manners of the flapper represented a "well-poised tension between the informal boyish companion and 
the purposefully erotic vamp." Fashions defended as practical also enhanced sexual attractiveness, the 
understanding of which shifted from the previous playing up of the waist, hips and breasts, to bare legs, 
shoulders and backs, as well as clinging fabrics in evening wear. Evening wear in particular was more 
self-consciously erotic and sexually sophisticated than the feminine flounces of earlier fashions. See 
Fass, op.cit., pp. 279-283. The erotic implications of bare or nearly bare legs and arms and plunging 
necklines did not go unnoticed. Bruce Bliven, in a 1925 article, noted the "Great Disrobing 
Movement" in fashion and asked, "Where will it all end? ... Nudity had been the custom of so many 
countries and over long periods oftime. No one who has read history can be very firm in saying that 
IT Never Can Happen Again": Bruce Bliven, 'Flapper Jane', New Republic, Sep. 9, 1925, at http: 
//www.geocities.com/flapper_culture. The skimpy nature of the new fashions provoked a voicing of 
concern among natalist doctors that the reproductive organs of young women might be damaged by 
draughts, just as 'scientific' reports warned women of the physical strains of their new professional and 
leisure activities in Weimar, and the danger to their reproductive organs: Roberts, op.cit., p. 72; Lynne 
Frame, 'Introduction' in von Ankurn, op.cit., p. 3. 
74 Female sexual development was a topic generating intense interest in the period. Freud saw normal 
female development as moving towards a point at which the woman desires not the penis but a child. 
See Dijkstra, op.cit., p. 364, and 372-376 on Hemingway's Lady Brett as an example of stunted female 
sexual development. 
75 Ibid., p. 72. 
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Geddes had declared, "What was decided among the prehistoric 
Protozoa ... cannot be annulled by an Act ofParliament."76 Women were excluded by 
their nature from politics in the system propounded by Rousseau, who founded the 
natural law of politics in sexuality and the relations between the sexes, so that male 
monopoly on civil power was conceived as a matter ofbiology.77 The 'chill-
mindedness' of women- their rational attitudes to their own fertility, and their 
rejection of the qualities and behaviours associated with maternity- had grave 
political implications. The 'masculine' woman was associated with the women's 
movement: militant suffragettes had often been accused of 'mannish' behaviour.78 
The New Woman's demanding of unprecedented civil and sexual rights aroused fear 
of cultural anarchy, of the disappearance of all that was 'solid' in culture. The 
reintroduction of altruism, the restoration of the woman to the role connected to her 
biological function, would restore crumbling social boundaries. 
Despite these highly 'political' implications inherent in the life she had 
chosen, the flapper was represented as having rejected her evolutionary task not to 
pursue any ideal, but to be a plaything for men. The flapper, Zelda advised, following 
her husband, was an artist in the field of"being young, being lovely, being an 
object."79 She not only rejected children but was a child herself. On the birth of her 
baby girl, Daisy (of The Great Gatsby) says, "I hope she'll be a fool- that's the best 
thing a girl can be in this world, a beautiful little fool."8° Flappers were depicted as 
wanting to be the irresponsible playmates of men, abandoning serious pursuits81 : 
Zelda wrote in 1925 that the "flapper creed" was to "give and get amusement," and 
that she was "infinitely preferable to the kind of girl who, ten years ago ... straightened 
your tie as evidence that in her lay the spirit of the eternal mother."82 The flapper had 
not finished with being a child herself, according to commentators: "we find the 
young woman of 1920 flirting, kissing, viewing life lightly, saying damn without a 
76 Quoted in Harrison, op.cit., p. 94. 
77 See Nye, op.cit., pp. 48-9. 
78 Jenny Gould, 'Women's Military Services in First World War Britain' in Higonnet, et.al., op.cit., pp. 
120-1. 
79
'What Became of Our Flappers and Sheiks?' p. 30. 
80 The Great Gatsby, Harrnondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1974 (1926), p. 24. 
81 For example, Frederick Lewis Allen noted in 1931 that women wanted to be the "light-hearted 
companions" of men, not the mothers of the race: op.cit., p. 108. 
82 What Became of Our Flappers and Sheiks?, p. 12, my emphasis. 
blush, playing along the danger line in an immature way- a sort of mental baby 
vamp."83 
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The flapper's rebellion was denigrated for having been dignified by no serious 
purpose. Her liberation was dismissed as a shallow, fiivolous way of pandering to 
men, while the world of consumerism used her 'emancipation' to sell goods. 84 Others 
took her resolve not to "have any more unwanted children" or to be debarred from 
traditionally masculine professions, as a sign that feminism had "won a victory so 
nearly complete that we have forgotten the fierce challenge which once inhered in the 
very word."85 The flapper was received with disappointment among older feminists: 
in 1922 Charlotte Perkins Gilman wrote that they seemed chiefly concerned with 
"mastering birth control and acquiring 'experience. "'86 Historians have similarly 
dismissed the flapper as apolitical: Dorothy M. Brown, for instance, said of the 
American woman that if the "Hard-won advances of the older generation were 
reversed or barely sustained by the middle generation" the younger generation "cared 
little for the battle or the cause."87 
The political significance of the flapper's rebellion was not overt; she voiced 
no specific demand for political reform or legislative change. But hers was a 
profoundly important revolt that was not easy to effect. The flapper wanted to live on 
83 F. Scott Fitzgerald quoted in Broccoli, et.al., op.cit., p. 79. 
84 Sarah Beebe Fryer, Fitzgerald's New Women: Harbingers of Change, Ann Arbor: UMI Research 
Press, 1988, p. 9. It has been argued that the media determined the image of the flapper's mobility-
featuring pictures of her driving sports cars and golfballs- 'depoliticising' her emancipation: Wilson, 
Adorned in Dreams, p. 185. Zelda Fitzgerald complained by 1922 that Flapperdom had become so 
fashionable, so mass-produced a style, that it was now " a game; it is no longer a philosophy": see 
'Eulogy on the Flapper' in Broccoli, op.cit., p. 78. The 'emancipated flapper' was a marketable icon, 
commodified especially in popular cultural forms like the movies and tabloids in the 1920s. This 
served to homogenise them, turning them into an "empty consumerist icon of woman," a trend Jeanne 
Mammen critiqued in her 1927-30 painting Boring Dollies. See Meskimmon, op.cit., pp. 183-4, and 
167-8 on the 'de-politicisation' of the neue frau by the popular media. Dijkstra, noting the 
"behavioural directives" fed to young women by the entertainment industry, saw the flapper as being 
"exploited and regulated by male fantasy, although they saw themselves as having fmally been 
liberated from Puritan constraints": op.cit., p. 358. 
85 Bl' . 4 lVen, op.czt., p. . 
86 Studlar, op.cit., p. 163. Even amongst the more radical feminists of the earlier generation, like 
Helene Stocker in Germany, the young 'new' woman was criticised for her selfishness. Stocker had 
fought for a new sexual equality embracing 'free love' as an act of rebellion against an outmoded 
double standard, and resented the younger generation's promiscuity and rejection of motherhood 
because she viewed it as merely hedonistic. It was felt that the flapper blindly took for granted rights 
that had been hard-won in recent memory by their elders, and that they were guided not by ideological 
ideals but by "fashion, mass media and consumerism": Usbome, 'The New Woman and Generational 
Conflict', pp. 146-9. 
87 Brown, op.cit., p. 192. Also see William O'Neill, Everyone was brave: the rise and fall of feminism 
in America, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969, pp. 295-7, and Mary P. Ryan, Womanhood in America: 
from Colonial Times to the Present, New York: New Viewpoints, 1975, ch. 6, for depictions of the 
American flapper as apolitical. 
70 
equal terms with men. One young woman said in 1922, "the feeling of comradeship is 
running rampant ... The girl does not stand aloof- she and the man meet on common 
ground ... "88 The flapper existed in a milieu that demanded she sacrifice her 
individuality to the ultimate universal: to duty. But the ideology of motherhood 
fostered in the 1920s was not merely a question of the need for repopulation following 
the demographic impact ofthe war. Motherhood and subservience went hand in 
hand, as the flapper well knew. These young women were punished for assuming 
their lives to be as valuable and full of potential as men's, even as they voted and 
worked beside them in growing numbers. 89 Despite the potential for social ostracism, 
the flapper insisted on being the comrade of the man, claiming her right to be 
recognised and valued as a self-sufficient individual, as he was. 
She often had to leave horne to do this, as the large city offered opportunities 
for self-expression that were not available in small communities, under the influence 
of family. In the city, as Zelda Fitzgerald's Alabama reflected, "Almost everybody 
had theories: that the Longacre Pharmacies carried the best gin in town; that 
anchovies sobered you up ... but nobody knew how to have a baby."90 The city, while 
representing danger to women as the 'masculine' aggressive sphere, was a space 
untainted by the narrow confines of traditional understandings of womanhood. It 
offered freedom of self-consciousness, a 'room of one's own' where there was 
literally no space for children, and the opportunity to do paid work, to be 
economically independent and self-sufficient. If the flapper seemed more interested in 
recreating freely with men than with 're-creating' them for the nation, she did not lack 
serious purpose. In this pervasively natalist climate, she insisted on living a life of 
intrinsic human value, independent ofher reproductive capacity. 
88 Quote from Fass, op.cit., p. 307. The new spirit of comradeship was reflected in radical new 
challenges to the institution of marriage. The notion of the companionate marriage was a controversial 
topic in the bourgeois world of the 1920s, partly because its proponents often linked it to calls for the 
legalisation of birth control within established relationships. Though the idea of a marriage that could 
be easily dissolved, given there were no children involved, was a topic of heated debate in all countries 
undergoing the trauma of changing gender roles, the best-known argument for it was put by Judge Ben 
Lindsey in the United States: see Ben B. Lindsey and Wainwright Evans, The Companionate Marriage, 
London: Brentano's Ltd., 1928. Oswald Spengler linked the 'new marriage' to the fall in natality: "now 
emerges the Ibsen woman, the comrade, the heroine of a whole megalopolitan literature from Northern 
drama to Parisian novel. Instead of children, she has soul-conflicts; marriage is craft-art for the 
achievement of 'mutual understanding'": Spengler, The Decline of the West, p. 105. 
89 Except in France, where women did not win the franchise until1944. 
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° Fitzgerald, Save Me the Waltz, p. 46. 
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Conclusion: 
'Women a:re good fo:r othe:r things ..• ' 
The 'chill-mindedness' detected in the flapper was the lack of will to nurture 
others, which in a woman translates as 'selfishness' and 'shallowness'. Fitzgerald's 
Gloria is described as having a "disturbed and childish heart" in a novel dominated by 
references to her revulsion at the "earthiness, the intolerable sentiment of child 
bearing."1 Depopulation was a moral issue because the collapse of a paradigm of 
femininity inextricable from motherhood, and the separation of sexuality from 
procreation made posible by birth control, foreboded a collapse of traditional gender 
roles. Women, freed from obligatory motherhood, can be equal partners with men, in 
marriage and society as a whole. 
Measures taken in the 1920s to raise the birth rate had no effect, as the official 
pronatalist line did not accord with the needs and decisions of individuals. States had 
fought only the symptoms of social and economic shifts: depopulation was a 
manifestation of deeper processes of social change, affecting all industrial countries, 
that could not be reversed. The debate about fertility decline and birth control was 
bound up with the debate about the changing roles of the sexes, and the realisation 
that female identity could no longer be defined by reference to the maternal, domestic 
role. 
Theories about fertility compare the fatalistic attitude of the 'traditional' man 
to 'modem' urbanites who are understood to be more open to change and innovation? 
These ideas were in currency at the time of the flapper's incursion into the male 
domain of the city. Mimicking the jazz musicians of their time, this urban-based 
middle or upper-class woman dealt in innovation, in improvisation, composing a 
'larger life' beyond motherhood. This was possible in large cities, spaces of 
potentiality where women went to work and play as autonomous individuals, taking 
advantage of the anonymity of urban space to create lives that were their own. 
The flapper brought about a revolution that would alter the lives of women to 
a startling degree. As Spengler bemoaned, "it is all the same whether the case against 
children is the American lady's who would not miss a season for anything, or the 
1 Fitzgerald, The Beautiful and the Damned, pp. 187, 319. 
2 Fawcett and Bomstein, op.cit., p. 123. 
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Parisienne's who fears that her lover will leave her, or an Ibsen heroine who 'belongs 
to herself - they all belong to themselves and they are all unfruitful. " 3 The flapper 
aroused fear and anger because she embodied the potential for all women to take up 
the 'case against children': that women cannot be independent and self-willed, and 
live on equal terms with men, if they are defined by fertility and family life. 
On New Year's Eve 1930, Pope Pius XI issued Costi Connubii, an encyclical 
on Christian marriage that denounced sex without intention to procreate, imposed 
absolute prohibition on contraception and abortion, and insisted on women's 
subordinate position within the family. It warned that the freedom to choose a life 
other than motherhood was "not the true emancipation of women" but the "debasing 
of the womanly character." The notion ofwoman's equality with men was 
"unnatural": a "false liberty," because the woman's descent from her "truly regal 
throne ... within the walls of the home" would rob her of her dignity.4 The encyclical 
was a clear attack on the New Woman of the 1920s in Western Europe and America, 
the flapper who had demanded the dignity of a life not determined by her biological 
capacity. 
These women demanded recognition as individuals first, and potential mothers 
second. The flapper said this by choosing fashions that made the breasts and hips 
"neither more nor less important than any other part of the female body,"5 by claiming 
the same freedoms and behaviours as men and working class women, by working to 
be independent, and by making the large city- anathema to traditional, 'maternal' 
womanhood- her home. Kollontai observed, "Before us stands woman as 
personality, before us stands a human being possessing a characteristic value, with 
her own individuality, who asserts herself- in short, the woman who has broken the 
rusted fetters of her sex."6 The flapper lived in a world that saw this as a false 
freedom, a false idea of womanhood: as a German newspaper decried in 1929, 
"woman's real work is motherliness, and thus sacri:fice."7 
The choosing of a different kind of womanhood, a womanhood conceived by 
others as false, was not an easy, 'egotistical' option. The flapper did not deal in 
frivolous contrariety. Though she has been condemned for being shallow, selfish and 
3 Spengler, The Decline of the West, p. 105. 
4 Quoted in Bell and Offen, op.cit., pp. 310-14. 
5 Roberts, op.cit., p. 68. 
6 Kollontai, op.cit., p. 74, my emphasis. 
7 Hausen, op.cit., p. 145, my emphasis. 
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flippant about the gains of feminism, nothing could be more 'political' than what the 
flapper represented: womanhood free from biological destiny, free to roam civic 
space, and 'good' for any number of human, individual endeavours. 
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